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Abstract
Concept of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) was brought up a few decades ago with
assumed prosperous future. Unfortunately, we do not see many practical applications
of them in real life. Security of MANETs is a big concern considered by investors and
industries, and hinders them from putting MANETs into application. Requirements of
security, and difficulties to meet these requirements have been stated clearly already; yet
solutions to these difficulties are not quite clear. Cryptographic technologies seem to
be capable of satisfying most of the requirements, which has been proved in Internet or
wired networks. However, most of the technologies, including symmetric and traditional
asymmetric cryptography (such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)), are inapplicable or
inconvenient to use in MANETs context. Identity-based Cryptography (IBC), as a special
form of asymmetric cryptography, carries many features interesting for MANETs. IBC
has been studied a lot recently by researchers of MANET security, and many applications
have been proposed and claimed to address this difficult problem. However, it is still the
case that most of the solutions are not sound enough to be used in a practical MANET.
This thesis starts with an intensive survey on the proposals of applications of IBC in
MANETs, and points out the issues, limitations and weaknesses in these proposals and
also in IBC itself. The thesis proposes a novel framework with key management and
secure routing scheme integrated aiming to address these issues. This scheme brings
these contributions: compared to symmetric key solutions, it has more functionality de-
rived from asymmetric keys, and is more secure due to using 1-to-m broadcasting key
instead of only 1 group broadcasting key, and has less keys to store per node due to using
asymmetric keys instead of pairwise symmetric keys; compared to traditional asymmet-
ric cryptography solutions, the storage and communication requirements are lower due to
IBC properties; compared to previous IBC solutions, it has no key management and se-
cure routing interdependency cycle problem. Security of the proposed scheme is proved
vi
and performance of the scheme is simulated and analyzed in the thesis. To the end of a
complete solution for an arbitrary MANET running in an arbitrary environment, the thesis
proposes enhancements to counter various attacks and options to abate or eliminate lim-
itations and weaknesses of IBC. The proposed scheme has a wide range of applicability
for various MANETs with little or no administrative overhead depending on situations
where it is considered.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) (the term Wireless Ad-hoc Networks is used in
the literature interchangeably) have been an active research topic for several decades.
The first stage of research was concentrated on efficient formation of an ad-hoc network,
i.e. routing setup. Then many researchers realized that without assurance of security,
formation of a network is meaningless—the network can be easily broken or taken over
by an adversary. During the last two decades, security of MANETs has gained more and
more attention.
Cryptography is a solution that can meet most of the security requirements. More
specifically, cryptographic solutions can be classified into two categories—Symmetric
Key Cryptography and Asymmetric Key Cryptography. The former has limited func-
tionality and cannot provide a complete solution by itself. Among the latter, Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a most poplar solution in wired networks. Unfortunately,
in MANETs, there are many difficulties or barriers that impede application of PKI to
MANETs. About 10 years ago, Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) emerged as a new
cryptographic technology. As a special and simplified form of asymmetric cryptography,
it has many advantages to MANETs, and has aroused much research interest. Most of re-
cent development on MANET security is related to IBC. There have been a large number
of proposals using IBC for MANET security.
However, after an intensive study and survey, we noticed and identified some issues on
applying IBC to MANETs. The main issues pertain to Key Management (KM) and Secure
Routing (SR). Both of these components are essential to a security scheme. Unfortunately,
1
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previous studies in the literature seem to treat these two components separately.
Indeed, they are interdependent on each other. You cannot generate either of the com-
ponents following these schemes if you do not have the other one already, and if you
have two of them from different schemes, you cannot couple them together in a system.
Additionally, these schemes are subject to many attacks due to loose coherency between
these two components. The issues we found motivated us to launch this research to find a
solution.
1.2 Research Objectives
The main objective of this research is to find a solution that addresses the identified issues
and is better than previous ones. Specifically, we aim to propose a novel key management
and secure routing framework that can be applied to the design of a practical MANET
without the issues we have identified. On the one hand, this framework should have ad-
vantages of IBC which has already been accepted as a prospective solution for MANET
security. On the other hand, this solution should address the issues we have identified
above and known issues of IBC schemes published in the literature. The efficiency and
performance of the framework in other aspects should not degrade compared to previous
ones. The framework should be scalable to practical size of MANETs. The framework
should be feasible and applicable to practical MANETs. The framework should be exten-
sible to accommodate specific requirements of various customers and in various scenarios.
1.3 Contributions and Applicability
This thesis studies MANET security requirements and solutions. Concentrated on IBC
solutions, the thesis points out issues of applying this latest and most promising technol-
ogy to MANET security. In light of the discovered issues, a novel framework for MANET
security is proposed in this thesis. The proposed scheme addresses key management and
secure routing interdependency cycle problem of previous IBC schemes. This scheme
brings these contributions: compared to symmetric key solutions, it has more functional-
ity derived from asymmetric keys, and is more secure due to using 1-to-m broadcasting
key instead of only 1 group broadcasting key, and has less keys to store per node due
to using asymmetric keys instead of pairwise symmetric keys; compared to traditional
asymmetric cryptography (PKI) solutions, the storage and communication requirements
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are lower due to IBC properties; compared to previous IBC solutions, it has no KM-SR
interdependency cycle problem, and is immune to insider attacks and mobile attacks and
many other routing attacks.
The result of this work presents a feasible security solution to a wide range of MANETs
where there is an administrator that generates and distributes initial system parameters to
all nodes, and the administrator can authenticate the identity of a node and assign the ini-
tial private key to it. Basically this includes all MANETs where IBC is applicable, with an
extra requirement—a controlled deployment phase. Examples of this type of MANETs
include, but are not limited to: sensor networks, wearable computer systems in military,
public safety networks, and emergency and disaster rescue teams. This scheme seems to
be the best security solution to these networks so far.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a background study
related to the research work presented in this thesis. Chapter 3 presents issues we have
identified when applying IBC to MANET security, and limitations and weaknesses of IBC
itself. Chapter 4 proposes a novel key management and secure routing integrated frame-
work to address issues of applying IBC to MANETs. Chapter 5 analyzes security features
of the framework with mathematical proof, and presents enhancements to counter various
attacks. Chapter 6 presents information about the simulation environment, simulation re-
sults, and related discussions. Chapter 7 presents solutions to limitations and weaknesses
of IBC itself applicable to the framework and other IBC schemes. Conclusion and future
work are given in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents a background study related to the research work presented in this
thesis. Section 2.1 presents an overview of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Section 2.2 sum-
marizes security challenges and requirements, and cryptographic solutions on high level.
Section 2.3 introduces Identity-based cryptography.
2.1 An Overview of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
There has been a surge of interest in ad hoc networks in recent decades. An ad-hoc (or
“spontaneous”) network is a local area network or other small network, especially one
with wireless or temporary plug-in connections, in which some of the network devices
are part of the network only for the duration of a communications session or, in the case
of mobile or portable devices, while in some close proximity to the rest of the network. A
Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is defined as an autonomous system of mobile routers
(and associated hosts) connected by wireless links, the union of which form an arbitrary
graph [25]. A MANET comprises a collection of two or more devices equipped with
wireless communication and networking capability. Such devices can communicate with
another node that is immediately within their radio range or one that is outside their radio
range, intermediate nodes forwarding or relaying packets in the latter scenario [84, 37].
This kind of network is very similar to cellular networks, but support from base stations is
not necessarily required. Actually, a MANET can be an extension or a redundant backup
of cellular networks. The allure of providing anytime, anywhere services without infras-
tructure makes such networks very attractive.
The development and exploitation of ad hoc wireless communication has been started
4
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 5
since 1970’s. Earlier projects on ad hoc wireless communication include Packet Radio
Network (PRNET) program, Survivable Radio Networks (SURAN), and Royal Signal
and Radar Establishment (RSRE)
The origin and early development of MANETs were attributed to the needs of battle-
field communication. In 1994 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
initiated Global Mobile (GloMo) [57] Information Program which recently concluded.
The flat (peer-to-peer) and hierarchical network architectures were studied. The hierar-
chical architecture uses modular system of link and network layer algorithms to support
distributed, real time multimedia applications in MANETs. It has three components: clus-
tering techniques, location management and virtual circuit setup and repair.
The generation of adaptive, multi-band multi-mode radios—the Joint Tactical Ra-
dio System (JTRS) offers improved flexibility over half-duplex, single-channel radios
at higher layers of the system because of the ability to transmit and receive on different
bands and using different waveforms [42]. The Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR) [77]
program of DARPA benefited from the results of the GloMo program and implemented
many of the technologies developed during the SURAN program.
At present, one particularly active application of MANETs is interconnection of sen-
sors in industrial, commercial, or military settings. Sensors are typically small wire-
less devices measuring environmental inputs and transmitting them to control centres [3].
There are many live projects going on in this area. For example, the Berkeley Wireless AC
Meter/Switch (ACme) Project. The goal of this project is to enable wireless energy/power
measurement and control of AC devices. This device fills the gap between inexpensive
LCD watt-meters (e.g. Kill-A-Watt) and expensive networked enterprise energy monitors.
ACme uses the ADE7753 energy monitor chip for energy and power measurements, the
SHARP solid-state relay for power switching, and the Berkeley EPIC wireless module for
communication [50].
Another application is that of emergency response and rescue. MANETs are well
suited for such applications because of their ability to create connectivity rapidly when
the existing communication infrastructure has been destroyed. One example of this appli-
cation is the European Project entitled WIreless DEployable Network System (WIDENS)
launched in 2005 which aims to offer a common communication channel through a wire-
less ad hoc network to all actors in an emergency situation in the field of operation at the
time of intervention, for each organization and across organizations [98].
Other prospective applications of MANETs include Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VA-
NETs) where vehicles can share up-to-date traffic information on the fly, and Mesh Net-
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works where end users are connected to each other via broadband channels based on
multiple connections.
In the academic community, the MANET chartered Working Group was established
in 1997 within Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The MANET activities are fo-
cused on studying routing specification with the goal of supporting network scaling up to
hundreds of routers [19].
2.2 Security of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
Research on security of MANETs remains active, despite years of exploration, in both
academia and industry. This is partially due to the fact that no mature solution is widely
accepted and also to the growing availability of small, personalized mobile devices with
peer to peer communication capability through wireless channels.
General security requirements for MANETs include [1]:
• Data Confidentiality that keeps data secret to outsiders,
• Data Integrity that prevents data from being altered,
• Data Freshness that keeps data in the correct order and up-to-date,
• Data Availability that ensures data to be available on request,
• Data & Identity Authentication that verifies that the data or request came from a
specific, valid sender,
• Non-repudiation that ensures a node cannot deny sending a message.
Security mechanisms that are widely used and proven to be effective in wired net-
works are not always applicable to MANETs. Attacks that can be effectively detected and
prevented in wired networks have been big security challenges in MANETs. Examples
include, but are not limited to, identity/address spoofing, message tampering and forgery,
message replay, etc. Compared to wired networks, the combination of the following char-
acteristics of MANETs makes it especially difficult to achieve security requirements:
• Lack of a network infrastructure and online administration.
• Network topology and node membership dynamics.
• The potential for insider attacks.
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• Computing and communication capacity constrained resources.
• Wireless link vulnerabilities.
Security proposals in early research are typically attack-oriented. They often first
identify several security threats and then enhance the existing protocol or propose a new
protocol to thwart them. Such solutions are designed explicitly against limited attack
models. They work well in the presence of designated attacks but may collapse under
combined or unanticipated attacks [89].
Cryptography is then used to support a general design framework. Cryptographic so-
lutions can satisfy the above requirements except Data Availability which requires assis-
tance of other technologies. Cryptography techniques used in MANETs can be classified
into two categories, namely, symmetric key based and asymmetric key based. In sym-
metric key based schemes, if an attacker compromises the symmetric key of a group of
users, then all encrypted messages for that group will be exposed. Asymmetric key based
schemes can provide more functionalities than symmetric ones. For example, key distri-
bution is much easier, authentication and non-repudiation are available, and compromise
of a private key of a user does not reveal messages encrypted for other users in the group.
However, asymmetric key based schemes are generally more expensive computationally.
Traditional asymmetric cryptography is used widely and effectively in the Internet; it
relies on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and can be called Certificate-based Cryptog-
raphy (CBC), in contrast to identity-based cryptography. The success of PKI depends on
the availability and security of a Certificate Authority (CA), a central control point that ev-
eryone trusts. With PKI, an entity has a pair of private key and public key. The private key
is bound to its public key that is signed by the CA with CA’s public key. The public key
and corresponding signature of the CA are presented in a public key certificate (PKC). In
communication, the recipient needs to know the PKC of the sender and the public key of
the CA, in order to authenticate the sender and verify the message. PKCs can be stored in
the recipient in advance, or retrieved on-the-fly from CA or centralized certificate reposi-
tory. However, in general MANETs, applying PKIs by maintaining a central control point
for CA or certificate repository is clearly not always feasible. Another obstacle that im-
pedes PKI’s employment in MANETs is the heavy overhead of transmission and storage
of PKCs.
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2.3 Identity-based Cryptography
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) is a special form of public key cryptography. It is an
approach that seeks to eliminate the requirement of a CA and PKCs. Since 2001, IBC has
attracted increasing attention from security researchers. Some properties of IBC make it
especially suitable for MANETs. Fang et al [35, 95] summarize the advantages of IBC to
MANETs:
• Easier to deploy without any infrastructure requirement. This saves certificate dis-
tribution, while bringing gratuitous pairwise keys without any interaction between
nodes.
• Its resource requirements, regarding process power, storage space, and communi-
cation bandwidth, are much lower.
• The public key of IBC is self-proving and can carry much useful information.
We believe that IBC, with its rapid development in recent years, is a promising solution
for MANET security problem.
2.3.1 A Brief History of Identity-based Cryptography
IBC is in the category of asymmetric key based cryptography. It specifies a cryptosystem
in which both public and private keys are based on the identities of the users. The idea
of IBC was first proposed by Shamir [81] in 1984. Such a scheme has the property that a
user’s public key is an easily calculated function of his identity, while a user’s private key
can be calculated for him by a trusted authority, called a Private Key Generator (PKG).
The identity-based public key cryptosystem can be an alternative for certificate-based
PKI, especially when efficient key management and moderate security are required. Com-
pared to traditional PKI, it saves storage and transmission of public keys and certificates,
which is especially attractive for devices forming MANETs. Thus, application of IBC to
MANETs is an important research topic in areas of both cryptography and MANETs.
For a long time after Shamir published his idea, the development of IBC was very
slow. Joux [51], in 2000, showed that Weil pairing can be used for “good” by using it in a
protocol to construct three-party one-round Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This was one
of the breakthroughs in key agreement protocols. After this, Boneh and Franklin [10] pre-
sented at Crypto 2001 an identity-based encryption scheme based on properties of bilinear
pairings on elliptic curves, which is the first fully functional, efficient and provably secure
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identity-based encryption scheme. In Asiacrypt 2001, Boneh, Lynn and Shacham pro-
posed a basic signature scheme using pairing, the BLS scheme [13], that has the shortest
length among signature schemes in classical cryptography.
Subsequently, a number of cryptographic schemes based on the work of Boneh et al
[10] and [13] were proposed. This type of identity-based cryptography is also named
Pairing-based Cryptography (PBC). There are also a few IBC schemes using other ap-
proaches, for instance, Cocks’ scheme is based on the quadratic residuosity problem [24].
Most proposals for MANET security in the literature use PBC.
2.3.2 Preliminaries of Identity-based Cryptography
In [81], Shamir introduces a novel type of cryptographic scheme, the so-called identity-
based cryptosystem, which enables any pair of users to communicate securely and to
verify each other’s signatures without exchanging private or public keys, without keeping
key directories, and without using the services of a third party.
Shamir states that “The scheme is based on a public key cryptosystem with an extra
twist: instead of generating a random pair of public/secret keys and publishing one of
these keys, the user chooses his name and network address as his public key. Any combi-
nation of name, social security number, street address, office number or telephone number
can be used provided that it uniquely identifies the user in a way he cannot later deny, and
that it is readily available to the other party. The corresponding secret key is computed
by a PKG and issued to the user when he first joins the network.” Figure 2.1 illustrates
his idea: In an identity-based cryptosystem, the recipient’s identity i is used to generate
the encryption key, and the decryption key is derived from i and a random seed k. In an
identity-based signature scheme, the signature key is generated from sender identity i and
a random seed k, and the verification key is derived from sender’s identity i.
In his paper, Shamir specifies the requirements of an implementation of such a scheme
and lists the implementation principles:
• The choice of keys is based on a truly random seed k. When the seed k is known,
secret keys can be easily computed for a non-negligible fraction of the possible
public keys.
• The problem of computing the seed k from specific public/secret key pairs gener-
ated with this k is intractable.
Based on these requirements, he states that the RSA scheme is not capable of supporting
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Figure 2.1: Shamir’s Identity-based Cryptosystem and Signature Scheme ([81, p. 52])
his scheme.
He states that at that stage they have concrete implementation proposals only for
identity-based signature schemes, but conjectures that such cryptosystems exist and en-
courage the readers to look for such systems.
Currently, most IBC schemes, and all PBC schemes, are based on assumptions of hard
Diffie-Hellman (DH) problems 1 in elliptic curves. The most frequently used assump-
tions are summarized below: [34, p. 7] (Refer to Table of Notations for notations and
explanations. Unless otherwise stated, we use the same notations throughout the thesis.)
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G1: there is no efficient algo-
rithm to compute eˆ(P, P )ab from P, aP, bP ∈ G1 where a, b ∈ Z∗q . 2
• Weak Diffie-Hellman (WDH) problem and Static Diffie-Hellman (SDH) prob-
lem in G1: there is no efficient algorithm to compute sQ from P,Q, sP , where
1A general Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem is to calculate gxy from gx and gy in a group.
2The general form of a bilinear map is denoted eˆ : G1 × G2 → G3, where G1 and G3 are cyclic, and
G2 is not necessarily cyclic.A Symmetric Bilinear Map is denoted eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 between two cyclic
groups G1, G2 of order q for some large prime q, where G1 is the group of points of an elliptic curve over
Fp and G2 is a subgroup of F∗p2
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P,Q ∈ G1 and s ∈ Z∗q .
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem in (G1,G2, eˆ): there is no efficient algo-
rithm to compute eˆ(P, P )abc ∈ G2 from P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 where a, b, c ∈ Z∗q .
• Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem in (G1,G2, eˆ): there is no
efficient algorithm to decide if r = eˆ(P, P )abc given r ∈ G2 and a, b, c ∈ Z∗q
Boneh and Franklin’s scheme, published in [10], is the first fully functional IBC
scheme. The paper refers to Shamir’s idea of the Identity-based Encryption (IBE) scheme
[81], and several proposals for IBE schemes such as [30, 83, 85, 64]. They consider none
of them to be fully satisfactory due to unrealistic requirements, such as users not collud-
ing, the long time required for private key generation, and tamper-resistant hardware.
Security of their system is based on the BDH problem, an analogue of the computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman assumption on elliptic curves. They build the IBE system from a
symmetric bilinear map and use the Weil pairing on elliptic curves as an example of such
a map.
A cryptographic bilinear map satisfies the following properties [34, p. 6]:
1. Bilinear: eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and all a, b ∈ Z∗q . This can be
restated in the following way. For P,Q,R ∈ G1, eˆ(P + Q,R) = eˆ(P,R)eˆ(Q,R)
and eˆ(P,Q+R) = eˆ(P,Q)eˆ(P,R).
2. Non-degenerate: eˆ(P, P ) ∈ F∗
p2
is an element of order q, and in fact a generator of
G2. In other words, eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1
3. Computable: Given P,Q ∈ G1 there is an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q).
Their scheme is specified by four randomized algorithms [10, p. 215]:
• Setup: The algorithm maps arbitrary string identities to points on an elliptic curve.
Set the system public key Ppub as sP where s is a random number in Z∗q , and P is an
arbitrary point inE/Fp of order q. Choose a cryptographic hash functionH : Fp2 →
{0, 1}n for some n. Choose a cryptographic hash function G : {0, 1}∗ → Fp. The
system parameters are params = 〈p, n, P, Ppub, G,H〉. The master-key is s ∈ Zq.
• Extract: For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algorithm builds public key for ID:
QID = G(ID), a point in E/Fp mapped from ID, and the private key dID as
dID = sQID.
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• Encrypt: Choose a random r ∈ Zq , and set the ciphertext to be C = 〈rP,M ⊕
H(grID)〉 where gID = eˆ(QID, Ppub) ∈ Fp2
• Decrypt: Let C = 〈U, V 〉 be a ciphertext encrypted using the public key of ID,
decrypt C using the private key dID: V ⊕H(eˆ(dID, U)) = M
Further, they analyze the security of their scheme, and state that the scheme has chosen
ciphertext security in the random oracle model assuming Weak Diffie-Hellman.
The scheme proposed in their paper is subsequently improved by many other re-
searchers, and widely adopted in many identity-based security schemes.
Following Boneh and Franklin’s scheme [10], many PBC schemes have been pro-
posed. Modified Weil Pairing and Tate Pairing are examples of cryptographic bilinear
maps. Currently, active research is being carried out to obtain efficient algorithms to
compute pairings.
2.4 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented background of the research topic area of MANETs, research chal-
lenges in security of MANETs and some solutions, and finally an introduction to Identity-
based Cryptography. The next chapter will present issues of applying IBC to MANET
security we have identified during this research.
Chapter 3
Issues of Applying IBC to MANETs
In this chapter, we present and discuss issues we found when applying IBC to MANET
security. Simply put, there are two issues: key management (KM) and secure routing
(SR). Section 3.1 reviews key management schemes in the literature, mainly those for
master key, private key and group key generation. Section 3.2 reviews secure routing
schemes in the literature. Section 3.3 discusses the issues we found in key management
and secure routing which motivated us for this research. Section 3.4 reviews limitations
and weaknesses of IBC itself and existing solutions.
3.1 Key Management Using IBC
Cryptographic techniques are often at the center of solving security problems in MANETs
and hence need key management. Key management in IBC requires key generation and
distribution methods, and ideally key protection and revocation. This section reviews and
discusses proposals for IBC key management in MANETs.
3.1.1 Master Key and Private Key Generation
Most of the master key and private key generation schemes are derived from and are
variants of Boneh and Franklin’s scheme [10]. The criteria to judge this type of scheme
is use of their four primitive algorithms. In this section, we first review some examples
based on traditional threshold cryptography of Zhou et al [99] and discuss the limitations
of these schemes, and then discuss some proposals that attempt to improve traditional
threshold cryptography. We also study some key generation schemes tweaked for specific
purposes: e.g. high privacy, compromise-tolerance, or light-weight.
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Threshold Cryptography
Many IBC schemes use threshold cryptography which originated from Shamir [80], for
their key management. Shamir gives a solution to the problem of sharing a secret among
a number of users in [80]. In his paper, he identifies the problem of how to divide data
D into n pieces in such a way that D is easily reconstructed from any t pieces, but even
complete knowledge of t− 1 pieces reveals absolutely no information about D.
Shamir proposes a (t, n) threshold scheme to solve this problem based on polynomial
interpolation: given t points in the dimensional plane (x1, y1) . . . (xt, yt), with distinct
xi’s, there is one and only one polynomial q(x) of degree t − 1 such that q(xi) = yi for
all i. To divide the secret D into n pieces, he suggests picking a random t − 1 degree
polynomial q(x) = a0 + a1x + · · · + atxt−1 in which a0 = D, and each piece is the
value of the polynomial at the n points: D1 = q(1), . . . , Di = q(i), . . . , Dn = q(n). Thus
any subset of t of the pieces can determine the coefficients of the polynomial (using e.g.
Lagrange interpolation) and thus the secret data at a certain point. He suggests the use of
modular arithmetic instead of real arithmetic. The set of integers modulo a prime number
p forms a field in which interpolation is possible.
This scheme was later employed by many researchers to construct a distributed PKG
in IBC and to solve security problem in MANETs.
Zhou et al [99] suggest the use of Shamir’s threshold scheme to secure ad hoc net-
works. The authors identify the problem to establish a key management service using a
single CA in ad hoc networks. They suggest distributing this service to an aggregation of
nodes.
Zhou et al refer to the work of Desmedt et al [32, 31] and indicate that they use
the theory of threshold cryptography as a basis for their work. The authors propose a
distributed CA architecture and PKI used in ad hoc networks. The CA service, as a
whole, has a public/private key pair K/k. The public key K is known to all nodes in the
network, whereas the private key k is divided into n shares s1, s2, ..., sn with one share for
each server. To provide the certificate signing service, threshold cryptography algorithm
is used—for a message m, server i can generate a partial signature PS(m, si) using its
share si and forward the signature to a combiner. If t out of n partial signatures are
collected by the combiner, they can jointly perform the operation correctly.
The idea of distributed CA has been subsequently adopted for distributed PKG in
many IBC proposals in MANETs later.
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Key Generation Using Traditional Threshold Cryptography
PKG plays a fundamental role in an identity-based cryptosystem, but it is not trivial to
have a robust PKG in a MANET environment. As Zhou et al have suggested [99], a CA
service of PKI can be distributed to multiple nodes in a MANET environment. This idea
is also applicable to IBC.
Khalili et al [52] propose to use IBC to secure ad hoc networks. The authors refer to
the work of Zhou et al [99] and Bobba et al [5] and identify the problem that all proposed
key management solutions assume either pre-existing shared secrets among nodes or the
presence of a common PKI. They propose to combine efficient techniques from identity-
based and threshold cryptography to provide a mechanism that enables flexible and ef-
ficient key distribution while respecting the constraints of ad-hoc networks. At the time
of network formation, the participating nodes form a threshold PKG, and generate—in a
distributed fashion—a master public key. The master secret key is shared in a t-out-of-n
threshold manner by this initial set of n nodes. All nodes in the network can use their
identities as their public keys. The secret key, corresponding to the public key, is com-
puted by having the node obtain t shares of their key from t-out-of-n of the original nodes.
All subsequent communications are encrypted and decrypted using the master public key
and the ID of the recipient. The authors based their proposal on Boneh’s identity-based
cryptosystem algorithms [10].
As a detailed implementation of Khalili’s idea, Deng et al [29, 28] propose an identity-
based key management and authentication system for MANET, using identity-based and
threshold cryptography. The proposed approach consists of two components: distributed
key generation and identity-based authentication. This paper describes algorithms for
master key generation, distributed private key generation, new master key share creation.
The system was built on the assumption that each mobile node has a mechanism to dis-
cover its one-hop neighborhood and to get the identities of other nodes in the network. The
key generation component provides the network master key pair and the public/private
key pair to each node in a distributed way. The system public key/master key pair is com-
puted collaboratively by the initial network nodes without constructing the master key at
any single node, as Shamir and Zhou suggested [80, 99] 1. The public key of node ID
1Each node Ci randomly chooses a secret xi and a polynomial fi(z) over Zq of degree t− 1, such that
fi(0) = xi. Node Ci computes his sub-share for node Cj as ssij = fi(j) for j = 1, 2...n and sends ssij
securely to Cj . After receiving n − 1 sub-shares, node Cj can compute its share of master private key as
Sj =
∑n
i=1 ssij =
∑n
i=1 fi(j). Any coalition of t shareholders can jointly recover the secret as in basic
secret sharing: s =
∑t
i=1 Sili(z)mod q , where li(z) is the Lagrange coefficient. Due to the homomorphic
property of share refreshing, the jointly generated master key is equal to ∑ni=1 fi(0).
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can be computed as QID = H(ID||ExpireT ime).
Another implementation of Deng’s scheme is described in Zhange et al’s work [93].
The authors implemented a scheme with distributed master key generation, private key
generation, secret share update, and secret share generation for a new joining node. One
thing they did not mention is how secret shares are distributed to other nodes from one
node.
Xia’s scheme [87] is also very similar to Deng’s scheme: A set of Distributed PKG
(DPKG) nodes collaboratively generate system public key and master key in a fully dis-
tributed manner; Shares can be updated among PKGs; New nodes can get their shares
from PKGs and become new PKG nodes.
Differences from Deng’s scheme are:
1. This scheme does not use temporary PKI for secret share distribution as in Deng’s
scheme. Instead, it employs a self-generated public/private key pair in the follow-
ing way: each DPKG node computes a temporary public key and sends it to other
DPKG nodes. Secret shares are encrypted and decrypted using this temporary pub-
lic key.
2. The author applies IBC to OLSR routing protocol, particularly use HELLO mes-
sages and TC messages in OLSR to select and mark DPKG nodes, while Deng et
al apply IBC to DSR routing protocol.
These differences lead to the following problems:
1. Each DPKG node has to store in memory the temporary public keys of other DPKG
nodes.
2. System public key and master key collection process is not secure, because only
public channels are available at this stage.
3. The keys generated are not guaranteed secure, because it does not provide any se-
curity protection for OLSR routing protocol it relies on.
All of these schemes use threshold cryptography to distribute the functionality of PKG
to multiple nodes. Due to threshold cryptography, these schemes have the following is-
sues:
1. Interdependency cycle between secure routing and security services: These schemes
rely on some existing routing or online administration mechanisms (e.g. out-of-
band communicant, side channel) to distribute secret shares among the distributed
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PKG nodes. On the other hand, as we will show later, most secure routing protocols
rely on secure keys. We identify this as interdependency cycle between key manage-
ment (KM) and secure routing (SR) in IBC, and as a specialization of noted prob-
lem of interdependency cycle between security services and secure routing [65, 88]
. These schemes cannot be used in secure routing protocols.
2. Proximity-caused insecurity: In some circumstances where a node can move in
order to access to more nodes, one way to avoid the KM-SR interdependency cycle
problem is to have a threshold number of authorized users that are physically close
to each other (i.e., within one-hop communication distance so that routing is eased).
This incurs another related problem—the proximity-caused insecurity: it is possible
that an adversary compromises these nodes within a short period of time (e.g., by
capturing the nodes and/or compromising them one by one ) [88]. Furthermore,
the proximity-based solution is not applicable to fully distributed key generation
schemes where all nodes participate in and contribute to the key generation and
thus routing connecting all nodes (not only among a threshold number of nodes) is
still required.
3. Mobile Attacks: Threshold cryptography is subject to mobile attacks, in which a
mobile adversary could move to compromise multiple nodes and reveal the secret
shares of them in order to recover the secret. To counter mobile attacks, the above
proposals use secret refreshing mechanism in which secret shares are updated in
intervals and new shares cannot be combined with old ones to recover the secret.
They assume there is only one mobile adversary in the network and a mobile adver-
sary cannot compromise enough authentic nodes within the share refreshing period.
Many researchers, e.g Merwe et al in [65], do not think this assumption is practical.
We will recall and discuss this problem further in Section 3.2 shortly.
Multicast Group for Threshold PKG
Li et al [58] point out that share refreshing in [99] needs a secure channel for delivering
subshares, of which Zhou et al did not provide the implementation. They propose a sign-
cryption scheme that exactly provides a way for secure transmission, by using periodic
private keys, multicast group of PKGs, and key proxy. Their work is based on work of
Shamir [81], Zhou et al [99] and Boyen [16].
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Li et al introduce a key proxy for key generation. A key proxy is selected from a group
of server nodes: all server nodes form and maintain a few multicast groups according to
location. A node floods its Routing REQuest (RREQ) to find a route to the server nodes
group. When it receives Routing REPlies (RREPs) from server nodes, it selects a server
node, say u, which has the shortest path to itself as its key proxy. The routing information
to the node u is stored. When it wants to update its private key later, it sends its Private
key update REQuest (PREQ) to u and u multicasts the PREQ to all server nodes. The
private key of a node is updated periodically. Server node computes a partial private key
of the client (dA,i) using its master key share, then signcrypts and sends it in a Private key
update REPly (PREP) message to A.
In order to check malicious server nodes, at the initial time of the network, PKG
publishes a piece of verification information consisting of si ·P for each server node i. To
check the validity of partial key it receives from i, node A needs only to check whether
the equation eˆ(QA, si · P ) = eˆ(dA,i, P ) holds.
Li et al use “proactive threshold” similar to Zhou et al’s [99], with two modifications:
replacing secure channel with multicast, and replacing a secret share with a vector. The
share vector is encrypted and multicast to the server nodes group. Every server node can
only decrypt its own share.
This scheme distributes partial private keys of PKG server nodes to the network before
starting for future secure communication, in a way like certificates in PKI. This is against
IBC advantages. The multicast group of PKGs is fundamental in the scheme, but a critical
question remaining open in this work is how the multicast group is formed. Secure multi-
cast routing cannot be established without secure keys. Thus the KM-SR interdependency
cycle problem is not addressed.
Offline Threshold PKG
Zhang et al [96] propose a distributed PKG (D-PKG) scheme to distribute PKG of IBC
to multiple nodes, based on work of Shamir [81], Zhou et al [99] and Boneh et al [10].
The master key of the IBC system is distributed to D-PKGs in an offline manner, and
then a threshold number of D-PKG’s can function as PKG. In each D-PKG, the Trusted
Authority (TA) supplements the network bootstrapping process with the following opera-
tions [96, p. 3517]:
1. Determine a (t− 1)-degree (1 ≤ t ≤ N) polynomial, h(x) = s+ a1x+ a2x2 + · ·
·+ at−1x
t−1(mod q).
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2. Select n (t ≤ n ≤ N) nodes as D-PKGs (denoted by SH). Each node in SH gets
a share of s as sk = h(k).
3. Calculate a set of share commitments as SC = {Pk = sk · P ∈ G1|1 ≤ k ≤ n}.
SH and SC are appended to the public system parameters and sent to all nodes. Similar
to schemes using traditional threshold cryptography presented above, any combination of
t D-PKGs can collectively reconstruct the system master-key s.
These D-PKG’s collaboratively provide the PKG service: NodeB sends them a private-
key sub-request containing its public key IDB . Upon receiving the request, each chosen
D-PKG sends back a sub-reply containing a partial private key: dB,i = siH1(IDB||other_
Info). other_Info may contain version number or expire time etc. B can verify its
authenticity using Pi: eˆ(dB,i, P ) = eˆ(H1(IDB||otherInfo), Pi) 2. After obtaining t
authentic private-key pieces, B can calculate the complete private key in the same way
computing the master-key.
This scheme is similar to schemes using traditional threshold cryptography, but differs
in the following ways: this scheme distributes secret shares offline, and thus does not re-
quire on-line secure channels for secret share distribution; the secret shares of this scheme
are not refreshed or updated, thus it is more subject to mobile attacks. Although the mas-
ter key generation does not require secure channels, the private key generation still needs
them; thus, KM-SR interdependency cycle is not addressed. Also, the share commitments
of each D-PKG are used like certificates which are distributed to the network nodes before
network starts. This is against IBC advantages.
Public Channels for Threshold PKG
Ren et al [75] propose another D-PKG scheme. The scheme eliminates the secure channel
requirement by using mutual authentication in public channels.
The key generation and issuing works as follows: A userUID chooses a password pwd
and computes H1(ID), H1(pwd), H2(pwd). Then it publishes the tuple 〈ID,H1(ID),
H1(pwd), H2(pwd)〉. The D-PKGs store them in their database. User selects a random
number r and computes a request and sends the request to D-PKGs. D-PKGs checks the
validity of the request and computes blinded partial private key and sends it to the user.
The user upon receiving blinded partial private keys verifies them and unblinds the private
key using the proprietary knowledge of r.
2The verification process is same as Li’s scheme et al [58] in subsection 3.1.1
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The authors claim that the protocol does not require any secure channel to issue the
private key and is secure. However, D-PKGs have to store a password for each user,
in the same way as the distributed CA works in PKC mechanisms. This violates the
advantages of identity-based cryptosystems, and requires online service from D-PKGs.
Also, the paper did not mention how requests and secret shares are transmitted in public
channel. We assume they use broadcast in the discussion below. In that case, the KM-SR
interdependency cycle problem is addressed, but two problems remain: first, security of
the private keys is not guaranteed because they only use hashing to protect the private
keys; second, it is not efficient because of communication and computational overhead of
broadcast.
A Threshold Key Generation Scheme with Compromise-tolerant Key-update Pa-
rameters
Fang et al [95] propose a key generation scheme that provides compromise-tolerant fea-
ture for private keys. This is achieved by dividing public/private keys into node-specific
and phase-specific components, and predistributed key-update parameters.
The cryptographic materials distributed to each node before network deployment in-
clude: pairing parameters: 〈p, q, eˆ, H1, P, s1P, s2P 〉, public and private keys: 〈QID,0, dID,0〉,
phase salt: salt1, key-update parameters: 〈{vi(x), li(ID)}i=1,...,m〉, where m is the maxi-
mum possible phase index, H1 is a hash function that maps a string to a non-zero element
in G1, s1 and s2 are two distinct master keys. PKG distributes s2 to D-PKGs using thresh-
old secret sharing, each D-PKG V ∈ Ω holds a secret share s2V and a set of values
{P2V = s2V · P |V ∈ Ω} where Ω is the D-PKG set, and |Ω| = n.
Each public/private key pair is both node-specific and phase-specific. At phase-i, node
A’s public key is QA,i = 〈H1(IDA), H1(salti)〉, private key is dA,i = 〈s1 ·H1(IDA), s2 ·
H1(salti)〉. The first element of each key is node-specific, and the second element is
phase-specific. Initially, the PKG issues QA,1 and dA,1 to node A. A can acquire phase-
specific element Qi+1 = H1(salti+1) and di+1 = (s2 · H1(salti)), where salti+1 =
salti + 1, from the D-PKG set through key update. In the key update, a D-PKG node Z
contacts t − 1 D-PKG, and collects t shares of di+1 and generates di+1 using a t-out-of-
n threshold cryptography. Z then broadcasts di+1 to unrevoked nodes securely using a
variant of the self-healing group key distribution scheme by Liu et al [61].
The key update parameters also facilitate key revocation feature, which we will discuss
in a later section.
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This scheme employs threshold cryptography for generation of phase-specific com-
ponenets of private keys online. It is not clearly stated how D-PKGs communicate with
each other to exchange secret shares. This process either relies on secure routing which
leads to KM-SR interdependency cycle problem, or relies on broadcasting which incurs
insecurity and extra traffic overhead. In addition, the scheme does not have good scala-
bility because the size of key-update parameters to be distributed to nodes before network
deployment is proportional to number of phases and number of D-PKGs, both of which
can become very large.
A Non-threshold Key Issuing Scheme for High Key Privacy
Threshold PKG key generation allows redundant PKGs for high availability of master
key. The opposite way is to use a chain of key privacy authorities (KPAs) to protect
master key for high privacy. Lee et al [54] propose a secure key issuing protocol in which
a private key is issued by a key generation center (KGC) and then its privacy is protected
by multiple key privacy authorities (KPAs). For all i = 1, · · ·, n, KPAi chooses his
master key si and computes his public key Pi = siP . Then KPAs cooperate sequentially
to compute the system public key Y = s0s1...snP .
A user ID gets its private key in three stages [54, p. 73]:
1. In key issuing stage, a node sends its identity ID and blinding factor X = xP to
the KGC and requests him to issue a partial private key. The KGC issues a partial
private key to the user in a blinded manner: Q′0 = H3(eˆ(s0X,P0))s0QID, together
with a signature: Sig0(Q′0) = s0Q′0. Here H3(eˆ(s0X,P0)) is a blinding factor. User
can unblind it using his knowledge of x 3.
2. In key securing stage, the user requests multiple KPAs in a sequential manner to
provide key privacy service by sending ID, X, Q′i−1 and Sigi−1(Q′i−1). Then
KPAs return the private key shares: Q′i = H3(eˆ(siX,P i))siQ′i−1 and signature
Sigi(Q
′
i) = siQ
′
i in a blinded manner.
3. Finally, in key retrieving stage, the user unblinds it to retrieve the real private key:
dID =
Q′n
H3(eˆ(P0,P0)x)···H3(eˆ(Pn,Pn)x)
= s0s1 · · · snQID. The user can verify the correct-
ness of his private key by eˆ(dID, P ) = eˆ(QID, Y ).
The authors have analyzed the security of this scheme and state that since the private
key of a user is computed cooperatively by the KGC and n KPAs, the privacy of user’s
3H3(eˆ(s0X, P0)) = H3(eˆ(s0xP, P0)) = H3(eˆ(P0, P0)
x)
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private key is kept if at least one authority remains honest. Only the legitimate user who
knows the blinding parameter can unblind the message to retrieve the private key.
This scheme was not originally designed for MANETs. In a MANET environment,
it has the following weaknesses: first, all KPAs are required to be online and available,
which is not feasible in MANETs; second, secure routing is required to get partial key
and signature, which is in KM-SR interdependency cycle.
A Non-PBC Lightweight IBC Key Generation Scheme
Saxena [79] proposes a scheme of public key cryptography for MANET analogous to
identity-based cryptography with some claimed advantages. This scheme can be consid-
ered as a lightweight IBC. This work is based on work of Zhao et al [99], Shamir [80] and
Feldman [36] on threshold cryptography, and on the work of Boneh et al [10] on IBC.
The author suggests the use of Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [36] to gen-
erate private keys and public keys. In order to setup the system, a dealer (or a set of
co-founding members) first chooses appropriate parameters (p, q, g) for the group, and
selects a polynomial f(z) = a0 + a1z + · · · + atzt in Zq, where a0 is the group secret.
The dealer keeps the polynomial secret and publishes commitments to the coefficients of
the polynomial, as wi = gai(mod p), for i = 0, · · ·, t. To join the group, a user Mi sends
its unique identifier idi to the dealer who issues it its secret share xi = f(idi)(mod q)
as the private key for Mi. The public key yi = gxi(mod p) of Mi can be computed
by Mj as yi =
∏t
j=0(wj)
id
j
i (mod p). Also Mi can compute Mj’s public key as: yj =∏t
i=0(wi)
idij (mod p), and pairwise shared key as: kij = yxij = gxjxi = kji(mod p). With
these keys, they define the sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt methods as counterparts to
Boneh’s (see [79, p. 382] for detail).
The author points out that the proposed scheme can be viewed as an IBC based on
threshold assumption. Knowing the identifier of a particular user and also the public
key of the trusted center, one can send encrypted messages and verify signatures. This is
equivalent to identity-based encryption and signature. The author further states that unlike
other IBC schemes, the proposal is based on standard (discrete logarithm) assumptions,
and thus is much more efficient than these prior IDC schemes.
According to Xu et al [88], Saxena’s scheme is arguably subject to Sybil attacks.
Besides, the scheme publishes per-node parameter wi to all nodes to compute public key
of user i, which is similar to certificate-based schemes and against advantages of IBC.
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A PKI-IBC Hybrid Key Management Scheme
Traditional PKI is based on PKC. In MANETs, because the computational and commu-
nication resources required by PKC operations are very limited, and also a centralized
CA is not reliable, traditional PKI is considered unsuitable. By applying IBC, new hybrid
PKIs can be setup and adapted to MANETs.
In [60, 49], Lin et al identify the difficulty of applying traditional PKI security archi-
tecture to MANET. They suggest the use of a hybrid architecture that combines the good
sides of both traditional PKI and IBC, and propose a cluster-organized key management
scheme.
Based on former work of Boneh et al [10], Huang et al [48], Zhou et al [99] and
Shamir [81], they propose a key management scheme and integrate it into secure routing
protocols. The proposed network framework is a two-layer hierarchical structure per-
forming key generation, key distribution, and storage. The bottom layer is responsible
for internal cluster domain authentication using IBC, and the upper layer, root CA, is
responsible for external cluster domain authentication.
In every cluster domain, cluster heads only maintain identities of members, without
needs to store and distribute public keys. The cluster head serves as the PKG for clus-
ter members. When a node joins the network, it is given a master public-key belong-
ing to a cluster domain. Furthermore, each node also applies for a personal private-key
from its cluster domain head, and uses it to achieve routing packets and messages en-
cryption/decryption capability. The identity-based key generation and distribution use
Boneh’s algorithms.
The authors state that the simulation results demonstrate that the scheme can reduce
computing loads of central CA and key repositories. However, at the same time, the
scheme adds much additional overhead to inter-cluster communication.
3.1.2 Group Key Generation and Agreement
In cases when a message is intended for every node in a group, using public/private keys
and pairwise communication generates tremendous traffic overhead. A symmetric group
key minimizes the traffic bandwidth, and is more efficient. The advantage of the group
broadcast key is that it needs only at most n private keys to be generated and distributed
to n nodes, whereas pairwise communication schemes need n(n−1)/2 and n(n−1) keys
generated and distributed respectively.
A group key can be generated by one member of the group and distributed to other
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members. A group key can also be contributed and agreed by multiple members. A
group key can be either dynamic, which means in each broadcast message the group
key is different; or static, which means the group key does not change in each broadcast
message once it is determined. In this subsection, we classify group key generation and
agreement schemes based on these criteria.
Dynamic Group Key Generation Based on Node-specific Broadcast Secret
If the members of a group of nodes share a secret that is unknown to non-members, it is
intuitive that they can generate a share group key based on this secret. Many group key
generation schemes are based on this idea. The differences only lie in how the shared
secret is generated and how it is distributed to members.
Bohio et al [7] propose a non-probabilistic method for computing unique broadcast
keys for different groups. Based on the work of Cha et al [18], they use identity-based
pairwise symmetric keys as the building block for their broadcast scheme. They state
such keys are computed non-interactively by the nodes, which reduces communication
overhead and simplifies key management in pairwise communication.
The group key is generated in this way: Let K1N be the broadcast secret of node 1 for
any group of N nodes. Node 1 computes its broadcast parameter P1−brdcst as: P1−brdcst =
K1N ·Qid1 , and distributes it to all candidate nodes using respective pairwise encryption.
To sign and encrypt a message M , node 1 computes:
h = H3(M), where H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗;
K1−brdcst = H2(eˆ(Qid1 , P )
(r+h)), where r ∈ Z∗q , H2 : G2 → {0, 1}m; C = M⊕K1−brdcst,
U = rP , V = K−11N (r + h)P .
The broadcast message is: 〈C,U, V 〉. Every node in the group can compute the same
broadcast keyK1−brdcst as node 1 from H2(eˆ(P1−brdcst, V )) and decrypt the message from
the cipher text C as: M = C ⊕ K1−brdcst; After decrypting message , its hash can be
computed as: h = H3(M), and authentication is verified by checking if eˆ(K1NQid1 , V ) =
eˆ(Qid1 , U + hP ) holds.
In [6], Bohio et al continue their work and indicate that the use of pairwise com-
munication creates additional bandwidth overhead in case of broadcast messages. They
propose an authenticated broadcast scheme based on symmetric keys and a correspond-
ing signature scheme. Based on work of Boneh et al [10] and Bohio et al [7], the au-
thors extend pairwise shared key generation method proposed in [78] — KAB = KBA =
eˆ(QidA , sQidB), and propose a method for computing collision-free broadcast keys that
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can be used for different groups in the network and changed as the group membership
varies. Such keys can be useful in the context when it is important to have all the broad-
cast keys unique without causing additional handshake between the nodes.
Compared to Bohio et al [7], the authors simplify the scheme: Node 1 computes its
broadcast parameter P1−brdcst as: P1−brdcst = K1N · P , and distribute it to all candidate
nodes using respective pairwise encryption. Every node will then compute the broadcast
key of node 1 as K1−brdcst using the hash function H3 : G1 × G1 → (0, 1)m. The
key K1−brdcst = H3(P1−brdcst). To generate unique broadcast secret K1N for node 1,
let D1N = eˆ(sQid1 , Qid2 + Qid3 + · · · + Qidn) = eˆ((sQid1 , Qid2) · eˆ((sQid1 , Qid3) · · ·
eˆ((sQid1 , Qidn) and K1N = H2(D1N). Further, the authors use this group key to sign
group messages M : 〈U, V 〉 = 〈rQid1 , K−11N(r + h)Qid1〉 where r ∈ Z∗q , h = H4(M).
And the receiver can verify if eˆ(P1−brdcst, V ) = eˆ(P, U + hQid1) holds.
The authors point out one potential problem of this scheme is that it might be possi-
ble for malicious nodes to generate computational overhead for other nodes by sending
unnecessary broadcast messages. The countermeasure is the non-repudiation and authen-
tication provided by the signature in the scheme.
In [8]—the extended version of [7] and [6]—the authors reiterate their scheme to
generate collision-free broadcast keys for different groups and an authenticated broadcast
scheme based on symmetric keys and a corresponding signature scheme. On the basis of
the former two papers, the authors present two variants of their former scheme to generate
group keys hidden to the TA:
The first scheme is based on group identity. A group public key QGRP−ID is to be
generated by the TA based on any group identity or arbitrary string. The TA, using its
master key, then computes the initial group key D = s ·QGRP−ID. Every node i will then
receive the point D from the TA and will generate its private key ki, a random secret, and
compute the corresponding public key as Di−pub = ki ·D. All such individual public keys
should be available from the TA. The participating nodes then get the public key of every
node from the TA.
For the broadcast key, parameter P1−brdcst = K1N · P is computed as in the basic
scheme with K1N being any random secret. The signature scheme would be used as in
the basic model.
The second scheme is based on individual identity. The TA will compute the partial
private key of any node i as Di = s · Qid−i. Node i computes its private key as ki =
H3(xi · Di), where xi is a random secret chosen by node i. It computes public key as
Di−pub = ki · P , and submits it to the TA. The pairwise and broadcast keys will be
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computed similarly as the first scheme does.
It has been pointed out by Chien et al in [22] that the above signature scheme is
vulnerable to the universal forgery attack that an adversary can forge signatures on any
message.
For group key generation schemes based on broadcast secret, one issue is how the
broadcast secret is distributed to other nodes in the group. If it is distributed by broadcast-
ing, the issue turns to be scalability problem. Each node generates a group key secret and
broadcasts it to other nodes. The number of messages and storage space are both O(n),
the broadcast traffic is O(n2) (each of n nodes relays n messages). If the group broadcast
secret is distributed using respective pairwise communication, it requires an existing se-
cure routing mechanism. The issue turns to be KM-SR interdependency cycle problem.
Another issue is that each node generates a broadcast secret and distributes it to other
nodes in the group. This is against the advantages of IBC schemes.
Static Group Key Agreement Based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
An approach for group key generation is “recursive subgrouping”—dividing a large group
to subgroups again and again, each subgroup contains a small number of sub-subgroups
until a small number of members reached. For these small number of members, there are
already key exchange protocols ready to use, e.g., 2-party or 3-party Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol.
Chien et al in [21] and [22], propose a group key agreement protocol in this approach,
based on work of Rhee et al [76], Kong et al [53] and Bohio et al [8], and apply IBC to
these schemes. In their scheme, they divide the whole group into several cell groups and
a control group, and each cell group is managed by its cell group controller independently
of the other cell groups. Nodes within the same cell group share a cell group key, which
can be generated by a distributive or contributory way.
They provide two versions of pair-wise key agreement: one is static and the other is
dynamic. The static one uses the same static pair-wise key as Bohio-Miri’s scheme [8].
The dynamic one, contrary to Bohio-Miri’s scheme, is certificate-less. The protocol works
as follows: A→B : PA = aP , B→A : PB = bP , where a, b are random numbers. Then
A and B independently compute a common session key based on PA and PB.
On the basis of the pair-wise communication, they propose a Tripartite key agreement
protocol which allows three parties establish their session keys. The scheme is modified
from Hess’ signature [44] for traditional public key setting. The protocol has two rounds.
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In the first round, the entities broadcast their ephemeral public keys, e.g. A→B,C:
〈sid, IDA, IDB, IDC , PA, P
′
A〉, Node A computes PA = aP, P ′A = a′P , where a and a′
are random numbers chosen by node A, sid is session id. In the second round, the entities
broadcast their confirmation (signatures) on the session and ephemeral public keys, e.g.
A→B,C: 〈sid, vA, uA〉, Node A computes mA = H3(sid, IDA, IDB, IDC, PA, P ′A, PB,
P ′B, PC , P
′
C), rA = eˆ(P, P )
KA, vA = H4(mA, rA) and uA = vASA + kAP , where KA is a
random number chose by node A. B and C broadcast similar messages. Then A checks
whether the following two equations hold: vB = H4(mB, eˆ(uB, P ) · eˆ(QB, Ppub)−vB) and
vC = H4(mC , eˆ(uC, P ) · eˆ(QC , Ppub)
−vC ) 4. After authenticating the message from the
other two nodes, A,B, and C share these session keys: K1A,B,C = eˆ(PB, PC)a, K2A,B,C =
eˆ(PB, P
′
C)
a, K3A,B,C = eˆ(P
′
B, PC)
a, K4A,B,C = eˆ(P
′
B, P
′
C)
a, K5A,B,C = eˆ(PB, PC)
a′
,K6A,B,C
= eˆ(PB, P
′
C)
a′
, K7A,B,C = eˆ(P
′
B, PC)
a′
, K8A,B,C = eˆ(P
′
B, P
′
C)
a′
.
The tripartite key agreement scheme can be easily extended to share n3 keys by send-
ing n ephemeral public values per node. The scheme then uses the ternary tree and bi-
linear map to establish the cell group key. Hierarchical ternary tree is a hierarchical tree,
where the degree of a node is at most three. The keys corresponding to the key nodes are
generated iteratively from bottom up to the root node, and the key corresponding to the
root node is taken as the group key. If a node has three child nodes, then the tripartite key
agreement scheme is adopted; otherwise, the two-party key agreement scheme is adopted.
This scheme addresses the scalability issue by subgrouping, but is subject to these
problems: first, each node generates an ephemeral key and distributes it to group mem-
bers, which is against advantages of IBC; second, key exchange messages use respective
pairwise communication, which requires an existing secure routing mechanism.
Static Group Key Agreement Based on Broadcast Ephemeral Keys
Characteristics of MANETs make it difficult to generate a group key. Zhang’s constant-
round contributory key agreement scheme [92] avoids the two obstacles for contributory
key agreement in MANETs: authenticating the exchanged information without an online
Trusted Third Party (TTP), and resistance to unstable links.
Using the IBC scheme of Boneh et al [10], the authors revised the constant-round key
agreement scheme proposed by Lee et al [55] that was on password-based. In round 1 of
the new scheme, each node generates an ephemeral key Ni ∈ Z∗q , computes zi = NiP ,
and signs it using the signature scheme of Du et al [33]: Ti = H(zi)sQi + NiPpub. The
4eˆ(uB, P ) · eˆ(QB, Ppub)
−vB = eˆ(vBsQB + kBP, P ) · eˆ(QB, sP )
−vB = eˆ(sQB, P )
vB · eˆ(kBP, P ) ·
eˆ(sQB, P )
−vB = eˆ(P, P )kB
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node then broadcasts them with its ID:〈zi, Ti, IDi〉.
In round 2, each of the group member firstly verifies eˆ(
∑
j∈{1,···,n}\{i} Tj , P ) =
eˆ(
∑
j∈{1,···,n}\{i}(H(zj)Qj + zj , Ppub). Then group members are divided into two sub-
groups. Only one subgroup broadcasts messages, and two subgroup keys are generated
once a time. Each node computes a group key based on two sub-group keys. In short,
for every group key’s information exchange at round 2, it only needs about half of group
members to take part in, while all members can compute out the same session keys ac-
cording to the broadcasted messages. This group is divided into two subgroups, and as
long as one of these two subgroups does not meet with the link failures, this scheme will
succeed.
This scheme requires an ephemeral key for each node which is stored on all other
nodes. This is a drawback inherited from certificate-based cryptography, and is against
the advantages of IBC.
Static Group Key Generation Based on Identity-based Broadcast Encryption
Zhang et al [91] propose another group key generation protocol that is quite different from
the above schemes. The scheme is based on Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE)
scheme [27]. In IBBE, one public key can be used to encrypt a message to any possible
group of identities.
The proposed scheme only requires each group member to broadcast one message
to set up the group key. Compared to Bohio’s scheme, this scheme does not require a
node to store any temporary or pseudo public key of other nodes. Compared to above
schemes, the scheme does not require secure routing for key exchange message, because
all messages are broadcasted. However, the group key generation is static and not suitable
for dynamic networks, such as MANETs, because it requires all members be determined
before protocol starts. In case of membership changes, for example, one member leaves
or one new member joins, all members must start the process again. Besides, like other
group key schemes discussed above, IBBE group keys are symmetric keys; but unlike
them, IBBE is not integrated with any asymmetric private/public key scheme. A different
set of parameters and algorithms is needed for asymmetric private/public keys generation
which is indispensable for authentication and non-repudiation.
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3.2 Secure Routing Protocols Using IBC
Routing in MANETs enables packet delivery from one node to another by way of interme-
diate nodes. It is the fundamental issue considered in MANETs, thus secure routing is a
fundamental issue in MANET security. Secure routing ensures successful routing among
authentic nodes with adversary nodes existing around or inside the network, and forms
the bedrock of a secure MANET system. An important application of IBC in MANETs is
to design secure routing protocols. Depending on what encryption/decryption and signa-
ture/verification schemes are used, and what routing protocols are used, there are various
secure routing proposals using IBC.
3.2.1 Securing On-demand Routing Protocols
Lee, Kim, Chung and Yoon [56] apply previous IBC schemes [10, 72] to a DSR routing
protocol.
In their routing protocol, the format of a route request packet is 〈RReq, SourceID,
DestinationID, seq, SignS(M), (IntermediateIDList),W, U, V 〉, whereM = 〈RReq
||SourceID|| DestinationID|| seq||W 〉, and SignS(M) is a signature algorithm from
[72]. Assume Qi = ni · P is the public key of a node (nS for the source node, nD for the
destination node.5), and di = s ·Qi is its private key, the source node computes W,U, V as
follows: It generates a random string σS ∈ {0, 1}n, and computes r = H3(IDSource, σS);
Using r and its private key dS = s ·nS ·P , it computes: g = eˆ(P, P ), eˆ(rP, dS) = gr·s·nS .
Then W = rP , U = gr·s·nS × σS , V = (eˆ(sP,QDest))r ⊕ r = gr·s·nD ⊕ r.
An intermediate node i that receives route request packet verifies the signature value.
If it is correct, node i adds IDi to the intermediateIDList, computes the new value of U
by: U = U× eˆ(rP, di) = U×gr·s·(nS+...+ni), and then rebroadcasts the packets generated.
A destination node D that receives routing request packet and whose ID is matched to
value ofDestinationID field in the packet performs the following procedure 6: computes
r′ using private key of D and the values of packet received: r′ = V ⊕ (eˆ(sP,QDest))r =
V ⊕ eˆ(W, s · nD · P ), gets the public key Qi = H2(IDi) of IDi that are described in
intermediateIDList and computes A = eˆ(sP,
∑k
i=1Qi)
r′ = eˆ(sP,
∑k
i=1 (ni · P ))
r′ =
gr
′·s·
Pk
i=1 ni
. UsingA value,D computes σ′ = U×A−1, and compares r′ andH3(IDS, σ′).
If the two values are equal, D makes route reply packet as 〈RRep, seq, (IDS, ID1, ...,
IDk, IDD),W, V⊕σ
′, SignD(M)〉, whereM = 〈RRep||seq||IDS||ID1|| ... ||IDk||IDD
5ni is only a helper for explanation purpose here, and is unknown to any node.
6with correction to the original paper
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||W ||V ⊕ σ′〉.
After receiving the route reply packet, the intermediate nodes in routing path and
source node S verify the signature of D. And if it is correct, they add the path in the
packet to their route cache.
This scheme is subject to wormhole attacks [68]—an adversary can tunnel a valid
RReq packet from an intermediate node to the destination to pretend that they are con-
nected. It also misses a key management scheme.
3.2.2 Concatenated Signature for Intermediate Node List in On-demand
Routing Protocols
Park, Myung and Lee [71] base their work on that of Boneh et al [10] and Quisquater
[59], and apply IBC to on-demand routing protocols.
Their protocol is similar to Lee et al’s [56], but the signature and verification proce-
dures are different:
When the source node sendsRReq to intermediate nodes, the packet format is: 〈RReq||
IDS||(rS, ZS)||SignS(H(M))〉, whereM = 〈RReq||IDS||(rS, ZS)〉, rS = H(eˆ(P, sP )x
||QS||RReq), ZS = xPpub − rSdS = xsP − rSsQS , x is a random number.
An intermediate node Xi computes k′ = eˆ(P, ZS) · eˆ(sP,QS)rS = eˆ(P, P )xs for the
authentication of the node that sends the message, and it checks rS = H(k′||QS||RReq).
If the verification is successful, the intermediate node can trust the received message and
then it computes rX and ZS similarly, and broadcasts the message to the next node as:
〈RReq||IDS||IDX||(rS, ZS)||(rX, ZX)||SignS(H(M))〉.
When the destination node receives this message, it checks the destination address. If
the destination address is the same as its address, it verifies the signature, (rS, ZS) and
(rX , ZX). If the verification process is successful, it is ready to reply a message. The
destination node sends a RREP message to the source node. After passing intermediate
nodes the reply message is like:
〈RRep||IDD||IDX ||(rD, ZD)||(rX , ZX)||SignS(H(M
′))〉.
Park and Lee [69], Park, Myung and Lee in [70], Lee and Sriborrirux [55] present
similar results separately.
These schemes have these common problems: A key management scheme is missing.
Scalability is poor, since message signature is concatenated and can be quite large.
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3.2.3 Aggregated Signature for Intermediate Node List in On-demand
Routing Protocols
The concatenated signature of an intermediate node list can be very large, Song et al [82]
apply identity-based multi-signature to routing protocols and propose an authentication
mechanism with aggregation signature, based on the work of Bonel et al [12] and Cha et
al [18].
In their scheme, an aggregate signature can be generated on distinct messages: as-
sume σ = (U, V ) is the signature on messages M1, · · ·,Mi−1, and σ = (U ′, V ′) is the
signature on message Mi, U = rQIDi, h = H1(Mi), V = (r + h)dIDi . The aggre-
gator verifies that Mi is different from any other messages. If it is true, it computes:
U = U + U ′ ∈ G1, V = V + V
′ ∈ G1. Then σ = (U, V ) becomes the aggregate signa-
ture on M1, · · ·,Mi. The destination can verify the validity of the aggregation signature:
Given identities ID1, ..., IDn, distinct messages M1, ...,Mn, and an aggregate signature
σ = (U, V ), the verifier computes hi = H1(Mi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then it checks whether
eˆ(
∑n
i=1 hiQIDi + U, Ppub) = eˆ(
∑n
i=1 [(hi + ri)QIDi], Ppub) = eˆ(
∑n
i=1 [(hi + ri)dIDi],
P ) = eˆ(V, P ) holds. If it is true, all the signatures are valid.
They then demonstrate in the paper the use of this scheme in on-demand routing pro-
tocols such as DSR and AODV, which is similar to [56].
This scheme is subject to wormhole attacks [68], and misses a key management
scheme.
3.2.4 A Security Architecture to Secure OLSR
Adjih et al [2] propose a security architecture to secure OLSR using IBC.
Their proposal is based on work of Cha et al [18] and Boneh et al [13]. In their scheme,
an (offline) TA is in charge of certifying or assigning keys of each node participating in
the trusted network. Each node joining the network will have the public key of the TA.
This key is denoted the global key. Later, any node entering the ad-hoc network could
diffuse its public keys, with a specific key exchange protocol, with proper parameters
and signatures. The key which is used later to sign message is called the local key, and
can be either its global key, or newly generated private/public keys. A node would start
originating OLSR control messages, signing them using the local key with a specific
extension which prepends a special signature message.
Technical details of the scheme are not given in the paper, e.g. how keys are generated
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and distributed, how packets are signed and encrypted.
3.3 Issues of Key Management and Secure Routing
Table 3.1 summarizes the main characteristics and problems of the master key and private
key generation schemes.
Table 3.2 summarizes the main characteristics and problems of group key generation
and agreement schemes.
Key management is an essential and fundamental service for ad hoc networks. Se-
cure keys should be set up before other services can start. This can be achieved by pre-
distribution of keys in network initialization phase. One advantage of IBC key manage-
ment is that it saves storage and transmission of public keys and certificates. Many IBC
key management proposals suggest generating master key and private keys online. There
is a problem in this case. Consider the following scenario: we need to find a key manage-
ment scheme to design a secure routing protocol. Since there is no routing for unicasting,
the only way to distribute keys or key shares is broadcasting that is not secure. It turns out
to be a group key agreement problem, and the group key agreement protocol cannot use
unicast routing at that time. Thus key management should not rely on any other online
service if keys are generated online. Unfortunately, many IBC key management schemes
in the literature do not comply with this rule—they rely on secure routing or online ad-
ministration mechanisms (e.g. out-of-band communicant, side channel) to generate or
distribute keys.
Another issue that needs to be noted for schemes in which a master key is generated
in a distributed manner (e.g. [52]) is Byzantine attacks. These schemes need an initial
policy negotiation process that is a potential target for Byzantine or active adversaries.
The system may be totally taken over by adversaries. For other schemes in which a TA is
responsible for the master key generation, this issue does not exist.
For group keys, static group keys are less secure than dynamic group keys, while
the latter takes more communication bandwidth in each message. In group key gener-
ation/agreement proposals, some use pairwise communication and unicast routing. Key
generation/agreement messages are distributed via pairwise communication which relies
on unicast routing. This leads to KM-SR interdependency cycle problem, e.g., in [8], the
group broadcast key is distributed to all candidates using respective pairwise encryption.
This process requires an existing secure routing mechanism.
In both master key and group key generation proposals, one problem is the use of
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Year Publica-
tion(s)
Main Idea & Contri-
bution(s)
Online
/Off-line
TA
PKG Key Share
Distribution
problems
2003 [52] Idea of applying IBC
and threshold cryptog-
raphy to secure ad hoc
networks
No Fully dis-
tributed
Secure chan-
nel
1. Technical details of key generation
are not given. 2. KM-SR interdepen-
dency cycle. 3. Threshold cryptogra-
phy weaknesses. 4. The network initial-
ization stage is vulnerable to Byzantine
failures.
2004 [29, 28] A complete implemen-
tion of Khalili’s Scheme
No Fully dis-
tributed
Temporary
PKI
1. KM-SR interdependency cycle. 2.
Threshold cryptography weaknesses. 3.
The network initialization stage is vul-
nerable to Byzantine failures.
2004 [54] Secure Key Issuing Pro-
tocol Using Key Privacy
Authorities
Offline Partially
distributed
Not men-
tioned
1. All KPAs are required to be online
and available, which is not feasible in
MANETs. 2. Secure routing is required
to get partial key and signature, which is
in KM-SR interdependency cycle.
2005 [58] Multicast group of
PKGs; Key proxy.
Offline Partially
distributed
Encrypted
Multicast
1. KM-SR interdependency cycle. 2.
Distributes partial private keys of PKG
server nodes to the network.
2005 [96] Offline threshold
D-PKG
Offline Partially
distributed
Pre-
distribution
1. KM-SR interdependency cycle. 2.
More subject to mobile attacks. 3. Dis-
tributes share commitments of D-PKGs
2005 [79] Lightweight IBC Yes Partially
distributed
Not men-
tioned
1. Subject to Sybil attacks [88]. 2. KM-
SR interdependency cycle
2006 [95] Compromise-tolerant
Key Generation
Yes Partially
distributed
Not men-
tioned
1. KM-SR interdependency cycle prob-
lem, or insecurity and broadcasting traf-
fic overhead. 2. Poor scalability.
2007 [75] Use of the blind signa-
ture to ensure the se-
cure issuing of the pri-
vate key shares in public
channel
Yes Partially
distributed
Public chan-
nel
1. Distribution and storage of password
for each node. 2. Security of private
keys is not protected. 3. Traffic over-
head of broadcasting.
2008 [93] Another IBC and
threshold cryptography
implementation.
No Fully dis-
tributed
Not men-
tioned
KM-SR interdependency cycle
2008 [87] Implementation of
Deng’s scheme in
OLSR routing protocol
No Fully dis-
tributed
Self-
generated
pub-
lic/private
key pair
1. Each DPKG node has to store in
memory the temporary public keys of
other DPKG nodes 2. Master public key
and master private key collection pro-
cess is not secure, because only public
channels are available at this stage. 3.
Does not provide any security protection
for OLSR routing protocol it relies on.
4. KM-SR interdependency cycle
2006 [60, 49] A PKI-IBC hybrid key
management scheme
Yes Fixed on
cluster
head
PKI Additional overhead for inter-cluster
communication.
Table 3.1: Summary of Master Key and Private Key Generation and Distribution Schemes
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Year Publica-
tion(s)
Main Idea & Contri-
bution(s)
Using
unicast
routing
Static/
Dy-
namic
Rounds problems
2004 [7, 8, 6] A method for com-
puting collisionfree
broadcast keys; Use
of signatures in
broadcast messages.
Yes Dynamic 2 1. Distribution of the broadcast
secret leads to either KM-SR
interdependency cycle or scala-
bility problem. 2. Node spe-
cific secret is against IBC ad-
vantages.
2005 [92] Authenticating the ex-
changed information
without online TTP;
Resistance to unstable
links
No Static 2 In round 1, each node generates
an ephemeral key and broadcast
it.
2008 [21, 22] Subgrouping a 2-
party/3-party Key
Agreement
Yes Static 2 1. Each node generates an
ephemeral key; 2. Key ex-
change messages use respective
pairwise communication, which
requires an existing secure rout-
ing mechanism.
2008 [91] Set up the group key
in one round based on
IBBE
No Static 1 1. Not suitable for dynamic
membership. 2. Not inte-
grated with any asymmetric pri-
vate/public key scheme.
Table 3.2: Summary of Group Key Agreement Schemes
temporary or ephemeral public keys: One node generates a temporary or ephemeral public
key and distributes it to other nodes. Other nodes then need to store it for later use.
This process is more similar to the way a certificate-based cryptosystem works. It is
inconsistent with the essence of IBC, and offsets the advantages of IBC.
Table 3.3 summarizes the main characteristics and problems of IBC routing protocols
in MANETs. As an aside, in the network layer, no cryptography-based routing protocol
is immune to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The adversary can bring the system down
by hijacking packets and garbling messages which leads to receivers consuming limited
resources on wastes. We do not consider this as a problem in routing protocols. A routing
protocol must satisfy basic security requirements mentioned in Section 2.2. There have
been some routing protocols for MANETs in environment with adversary nodes, which
do not rely on secure keys, e.g.: Marti et al [63] uses a watchdog to monitor behavior of
nodes and a pathrater to find routes among nodes trustworthy; Buchegger et al proposes
CONFIDANT protocol [17] that rewards nodes forwarding packets and punishes nodes
not forwarding packets; Michiardi et al proposes a reputation mechanism that extends
pathrater [66] to more protocols and improves security by disallowing negative rating.
CHAPTER 3. ISSUES OF APPLYING IBC TO MANETS 35
Year Protocol(s) Main Contribution(s) Routing
protocol
based on
Require-
ments not
satisfied
problems
2003 ODSRP [56] A secure DSR routing protocol
using IBC
DSR Confidentiality,
authenticity
1. Missing a
key management
scheme. 2. Subject
to wormhole attacks.
2005 LSRP [71] Concatenated Signature and
verification of routing messages
in on-demand routing protocols
On-
demand
routing
protocols
Confidentiality 1. Missing a
key management
scheme. 2. Message
signature is concate-
nated and can be
large.
2005 Multi-
signature
Routing
Protocol
[82]
A authentication mechanism
with aggregation signature
On-
demand
routing
protocols
Confidentiality 1. Missing a
key management
scheme. 2. Subject
to wormhole attacks.
2005 A Security
Architec-
ture to
Secure
OLSR[2]
The security issues of OLSR,
and an architecture including
multiple securing mechanisms.
OLSR Not clear Details not given.
Table 3.3: Summary of Secure Routing Schemes
These routing protocols mainly aim at improving routing availability, and do not provide
authentication of node’s identity, confidentiality, integrity, freshness, and non-repudiation
of routing messages, which rely on use of secure keys. To meet all of these requirements,
a cryptosystem with a unique private key for each entity is required. However, from
this and the previous sections, we can see that many key management schemes assume
a secure routing is available; at the same time, many secure routing schemes assume
secure keys are already available. This chicken-and-egg-like paradox is noted as SR-KM
interdependency cycle problem.
IBC provides many advantages in terms of secure routing. Many simulation works
from above publications show that IBC secure routing schemes improve efficiency over
counterparts using traditional cryptosystems. However, as many of the above schemes
fail to note, we summarize main issues of above proposals:
• Secure routing relies on secure keys that are not available before secure routing is
set up.
• Many of the routing protocols are subject to various routing attacks, due to incom-
plete or flawed encryption/signature schemes.
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• Each routing protocol has its own weakness. For example, the above routing proto-
cols based on AODV are all subject to wormhole attacks.
3.4 Limitations and Weaknesses from IBC
We have mentioned many properties of IBC which make it especially attractive for MANETs.
However, there are still some problems not completely addressed which impedes appli-
cation of IBC in MANETs. In this section, we will study “key escrow”, “identity disclo-
sure”, and “identity revocation” problems, and proposals to address them. We deliberately
omit those explained in Section 3.1 or Section 3.2.
3.4.1 Identity Disclosure
The main advantage of IBC is that the public key of an entity is its identity that is pig-
gybacked and explicit in the message. This leads to the problem of identity exposure —
the identity of any node is exposed to all others. In some MANET systems, this is not
desirable, e.g. for those used in battlefield, this may expose the identity of a commander
to the enemy, which then enables traffic analysis and incurs great danger.
Special characteristics of MANETs lend them many security and privacy concerns.
One concern is traffic analysis. By definition, it is a passive attack such that an adversary
observes network traffic and infers sensitive information of the applications and/or the
underlying system, for example, sensitive information about the communicating entities
[41]. The information could be related to the identities of the communicating parties, or
to the network traffic patterns or even to the changes in the traffic pattern. Both packet
contents and header fields can reveal the information of packet sources and destinations.
In wireless environments, the adversaries can easily capture transmitted packets and con-
duct traffic analysis. The shared wireless medium introduces opportunities for passive
eavesdropping on data communications. Thus traffic analysis is one of the most subtle
and unsolved security attacks against MANETs.
To prevent traffic analysis, anonymity is required in the communication. Pfitzmann
and Hansen [73] defined the anonymity as the state of being not identifiable within a set
of subjects, that is, the anonymity set. The anonymity set is the set of all possible acting
subjects such as human beings, legal persons or computers.
CHAPTER 3. ISSUES OF APPLYING IBC TO MANETS 37
MASK for Anonymous Communications
Zhang et al propose an IBC anonymous communication scheme in MANETs [94]. The
authors identify the problem of malicious traffic analysis in MANETs due to the broad-
cast nature of radio transmission, and propose an anonymous on-demand routing protocol
termed MASK. Derived from work of [10, 4], the protocol enables anonymous communi-
cations by allowing neighboring nodes to authenticate each other without revealing their
identities.
The PKG pre-calculates a large set of collision-resistant pseudonyms and a corre-
sponding secret point set. During the bootstrapping phase, a TA distributes system public
parameters. Moreover, the TA furnishes each node IDi with a sufficiently large set PSi
of collision-resistant pseudonyms and a corresponding secret point set. No one but the
PKG can link a given pseudonyms to a particular node or identity, or deduce the corre-
sponding secret point with non-negligible probability. Using PSi and nonces n1, n2, A
andB can calculate γ pairs of shared session key (SKey) and link identifier (LinkID) as:
KγAB = H2(KAB||n1||n2||2 ·γ), L
γ
AB = H2(KAB||n1||n2||2 ·γ+1) (see [94, p. 1943] for
details). Such 〈SKey, LinkID〉 pairs are unique due to collision-resistant hash functions
H1 and H2. The LinkIDs will be used to identify the packets transmitted between A and
B and the SKey can be used to encrypt, integrity-protect, or authenticate the content of
the packets if needed.
Based on this anonymous neighborhood authentication scheme, the authors propose an
improved AODV routing protocol which enables communication between nodes without
disclosing the real identity of the node.
The authors evaluate the computation costs of the critical cryptographic operations in
their scheme. In this implementation, the routing information is not authenticated, they
plan to combine MASK with other secure routing schemes to provide an anonymous yet
secure routing protocol.
Problems of this scheme are: First, each node maintains a large set of pseudonyms
and the corresponding private keys for each pseudonym. This is resource consuming, and
against advantages of IBC. Second, it can only be used in their own routing protocol and
not in any other protocol or any higher layer application, because it uses link identifier to
transport packets among nodes without using real identities, but there seems no way to
convert link identifier’s back to identities.
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3.4.2 Key Revocation Difficulty
Due to the weak physical protection of nodes, node compromises including key disclo-
sures are very likely in MANETs. Meanwhile, the infrastructure for certificate or public
key revocation does not exist in MANETs. Frequent key renewals to prevent such com-
promises are either computationally challenging in solution with distributed on-line key
generation or infeasible in solutions with off-line key generation.
Appending “Expire Time” to the Identity
In the very beginning of IBC, the public key of node ID was computed as DID =
H(ID||ExpireT ime) to allow identity revocation [10, 28, 29, 52].
Hoeper et al [47] propose a scheme for key revocation and key renewal using an IBC
scheme in MANET. This work is based on their former work in [46], and the work of
[26, 62]. To enable key renewal in IBC schemes, they introduce a new format for ID-
based public keys: DID = H(ID||ti||vi), where ti denotes the expiration date, and vi is
the version number. The version number always starts with 1 for every new expiry date
and is incremented with each key renewal for the same date.
New keys can be issued for the same identity after the previous key has been revoked.
And new nodes that join the network can learn about past accusations and revocations.
Upon receiving a new key pair and re-joining the network, a node only needs to broadcast
its new public key to m-hop neighborhood. The receivers update the version number in
their revocation lists accordingly and set all accusation values for this node to zero. The
level of security can be chosen as performance trade-off.
These proposals append extra information to an identity to generate a public key. This
seemingly tiny change in public keys leads to some complications in MANETs: It was
first intended for Internet applications where arbitrary identities are accepted, e.g. email
services, and works well there. As in the network layer of MANETs where identities are
usually fixed, such as MAC addresses or IP addresses, the identity in a packet can no
longer be an arbitrary string, and there is no separate field for an extra identity. Further-
more, this scheme requires precise synchronization among all network nodes, which is
difficult to achieve in a MANET environment.
Key-update Parameters
Zhang et al [95] propose to use key-update parameters to revoke voided public and private
keys, using a variant of the self-healing group key distribution scheme by Liu et al [61].
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The key generation was explained in Section 3.1.1.
Before network deployment, key-update parameters: 〈{vi(x), li(ID)}i=1,...,m〉, where
m is the maximum possible phase index, are distributed to all nodes. The PKG generates
private keys di for a node for all phases i = 1, ..., m (strictly speaking, the phase-specific
components of private keys which are then combined with node-specific components to
generate a node’s private key). The PKG calculates the differences vi between di series
and a polynomial series ui, and distribute the difference series vi to all nodes. At a later
phase, online D-PKGs only provide the ui series to unrevoked nodes. In this way, revoked
nodes cannot update their private keys.
Key-update parameters are generated in this way: the PKG picksm distinct 2tc-degree
polynomials, denoted by {li(x) =
∑2tc
j=0 li,jx
j(mod q)}i=1,...,m with li,j ∈ Z∗q , and m
distinct tc-degree polynomials, denoted by {ui(x) =
∑tc
j=0 ui,jx
j(mod q)}i=1,...,m with
ui,j ∈ Z
∗
q . The PKG then constructs {vi(x) = diy − ui(x)}i=1,...,m, where diy denotes
y-coordinate of the elliptical curve point di represents.
At phase i, a D-PKG node, say Z, collects secret shares and generates private key
di. Z broadcasts the following message: Bi := {IDX}X∈Λ
⋃
{Uj(x) = ξj(x)uj(x) +
lj(x)}j=1,...i, where Λ denotes the set of nodes revoked until phase i, ξj(x) =
∏
x∈Λ(x −
IDX). An unrevoked node B can deriveUi(ID) = ξi(IDB)ui(IDB)+ li(IDB), and then
get ui(IDB) = Ui(IDB)−li(IDB)ξi(IDB) and then diy = vi(IDB) + ui(IDB), while a revoked one
X cannot get ui(IDX) because ξi(IDX) = 0.
Though this scheme is novel and sound, there exists a possible drawback: The scheme
does not have good scalability, since the phase-specific components of all phases need
to be calculated before network deployment to get key-update parameters and furnish all
nodes with them, and size of parameters to be distributed to D-PKGs is also proportional
to number of D-PKGs.
3.4.3 Key Escrow
Key escrow is inherent in IBC. The PKG or the TA that generates private keys for nodes
knows the private key of each node and can eavesdrop the traffic or impersonate it. Al-
though it may be a desirable feature in some cases (e.g. in military hierarchy), it is a
problem with some MANETs.
Solutions for key escrow problem in general IBC include:
• Using additional private/public key pairs [38]. This solution is not pure IBC scheme,
and is against advantages of IBC.
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• Using threshold cryptography to distribute the secret key to multiple nodes [10, 54,
15, 20, 67, 72]. We have mentioned problems incurred by threshold cryptography
in Section 3.1.
• Key Exchange Protocols without Key-escrow: Hoeper and Gong [45] propose a set
of key exchange protocols without key-escrow, based on the work of [10, 44].
In these protocols, a TTP computes the private key for each node using a master
key and node’s public key QID, and distributes the key over a secure channel during
network initialization. After initialization, the TTP is not needed, and any two nodes
share a pairwise secret key. To provide forward security and prevent the TTP from
being a key escrow, the authors propose some protocols. A basic form of these
protocols is: First, KAB is divided into two parts Ke and Ka. Encryption under
Ke prevents all other nodes from reading the messages, whereas Ka is used in a
message authentication code (MAC) to enable mutual authentication. Then, Each
of A and B chooses an arbitrary key K1 and K2 separately and exchanges them
using Ka and Ke. A shared session key can be set up as Kses = f(K1, K2). By
replacing K1 and K2 with different forms, different properties can be obtained.
The scheme is not applicable to routing protocols, because it assumes secure routing
is ready.
3.5 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter reviewed previous schemes applying IBC to MANETs, and identified main
issues of them: key management and secure routing interdependency cycle; use of tempo-
rary or ephemeral keys which degrades the scheme to a CBC-like system; vulnerabilities
to certain attacks; extra overhead and insecurity of broadcasting. This chapter also listed
some features of IBC itself that are considered as limitations and weaknesses in MANET
context. We next will analyze these problems and propose a security framework that
addresses these problems.
Chapter 4
A Novel Key Management and Secure
Routing Integrated Framework
In the previous chapter, we identified the main issue on applying IBC to MANETs—key
management and secure routing interdependency cycle. In this chapter, we analyze this
issue and propose our solution to it—a key management and secure routing integrated
framework. Other issues will be discussed in later chapters.
4.1 Basic Idea and Overview of the Framework
Secure routing is the bedrock of a secure MANET. The requirements mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2 are the basic requirements for a secure routing. To meet these requirements, a
key management scheme is needed (confidentiality is not very important for routing mes-
sages, but is important for key management messages). On highest level, key management
schemes can be classified into two categories. The first category makes use of prior se-
curity context distributed before network starts. The second category does not depend on
any prior shared context, and is self-organized. We do not consider the second category of
key management schemes capable for secure routing, because there is no way to meet the
requirements for secure routing mentioned above unless it is guaranteed that no adversary
node would participate in routing setup. For example, we cannot verify if the identity
presented by a node really belongs to itself, or if a single node uses multiple identities.
Thus we only consider the first category in our scheme. In this category, we can distribute
security context in the form of symmetric keys or asymmetric keys. The latter includes
Certificate-based Cryptography (CBC), and Identity-based Cryptography (IBC).
41
CHAPTER 4. A NOVEL KM-SR INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 42
Symmetric key solutions are widely used in sensor networks. One reason for this fact
is that in most sensor networks there are base stations available which simplifies sym-
metric key management, but base stations are not always available for general MANETs.
Secure pairwise communication with symmetric keys requires too many keys to be dis-
tributed and stored on nodes. In a traditional symmetric key management scheme, if there
are n nodes in a network, each node needs to store n − 1 keys and a total of n(n − 1)/2
keys need to be generated and distributed in the network. Symetric key scheme can only
provide pairwise authentication and non-repudiation, and does not support network wide
authentication and non-repudiation, because each key is shared by a pair of nodes at least.
To meet the requirements of secure routing, a cryptosystem with a unique private key
for each entity is required. However, many key management schemes assume a secure
routing is available; at the same time, many secure routing schemes assume secure keys
are already available. For example, Zhou et al [99] propose a distributed CA architecture
that can be used in a CBC. The distributed CA can sign private keys of nodes in a dis-
tributed fashion. Many IBC schemes generate private keys in the same approach using
distributed Private Key Generator (PKG) nodes. These schemes rely on some existing
routing or online administration mechanisms (e.g. out-of-band communicant, side chan-
nel) to distribute secret shares among the distributed PKG nodes. Thus, they cannot be
used to set up secure routing that would require secure keys. This is noted as KM-SR
interdependency cycle problem (Chapter 3).
We summarize main features and drawbacks of symmetric cryptography, CBC and
traditional IBC in Table 4.1
From the above table, we can see that if we can remove KM-SR interdependency cycle
from IBC, it would be the best solution for key management and secure routing.
We consider using IBC in a secure routing scheme because IBC has the following
advantages in secure routing which has already been noted in the literature:
• IBC eases the process of key distribution. Key exchange messages can be spared.
Pairwise keys are available with only a few security parameters distributed at the
network deployment phase, which is not possible with traditional symmetric key or
CBC cryptosystems. The sender and receiver share a default pairwise key KAB =
eˆ(dA, QB) = eˆ(dB, QA) = KBA without any extra distribution and storage of keys.
This is critical to routing protocols because until routing is set up there seems no
way to distribute or negotiate secret keys among nodes. Traditional symmetric or
asymmetric cryptography requires a large amount of keys to distribute and store.
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(a) Previous KM-SR scheme
1 .  C o n t r o l l e d  s y s t e m  p a r a m e t e r s  d i s t r i b u t i o n 2 .  S e c u r e  r o u t i n g  s e t u p  a n d  
    s e c u r e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b a s e d
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k e y
i n t e g r a t e d
k e y
i n t e g r a t e d
k e y
i n t e g r a t e d
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(b) Proposed KM-SR Integrated Framework
Figure 4.1: Comparison between Previous and Proposed KM-SR Integrated Framework
CHAPTER 4. A NOVEL KM-SR INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 44
KM scheme Number of
keys to store
per node
Security
Features
KM-SR
Interdependency
Symmetric
Key
Cryptography
O(n)
(n: the number of
nodes in the network)
Confidentiality,
integrity
No
CBC O(n)
(n: the number of
nodes in the network)
Confidentiality,
integrity,
authentication,
non-repudiation
Yes
Traditional
IBC
Constant Confidentiality,
integrity,
authentication,
non-repudiation
Yes
Our goal Constant Confidentiality,
integrity,
authentication,
non-repudiation
No
Table 4.1: Features and Drawbacks of Symmetric Cryptography, CBC and Traditional
IBC
• IBC improves efficiency of secure routing. Once secure keys are avaiable, IBC
can be applied to either on-demand routing protocols like Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR) and Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing, or link state
routing protocols like Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR). The routing mes-
sages are encrypted and signed by the sender and decrypted and verified by the
receiver using IBC. To protect routing messages, on same security level, IBC en-
cryption/decryption is faster, and IBC signature/verification is shorter.
Nevertheless, we note that the first advantage does not help in initial routing setup. First,
in many existing proposals, pairwise keys are available only after initial routing is set up.
Second, even if pairwise keys are available at initial routing setup phase, they still have
no use then because pairwise routing is not available. It is only useful after routing is set
up, e.g. for routing update.
Here we see a gap between key management schemes and secure routing schemes, the
reason is that the first phase of routing setup must definitely be broadcasting, as is done in
every routing protocol. A secure broadcasting scheme is needed for initial routing setup.
This is an insight into the KM-SR interdependency cycle problem.
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The solution to break the KM-SR interdependency cycle problem needs to have the
following properties as prerequisites:
• A key management scheme not relying on secure routing, as suggested by Hegland
et al in [43]. This is required because secure routing should not be working without
secure keys.
• A secure broadcasting scheme that meets all the security requirements listed in
Section 2.2. This is required because the first stage of a secure routing is secure
broadcasting.
We here propose a KM-SR integrated framework. The kernel of this framework is
a key management integrated routing protocol which breaks KM-SR interdependency
cycle. The design of this protocol is based on these notions:
• Key management should not rely on secure routing.
• Secure keys should be available before a routing protocol starts working.
• Secure routing starts from secure broadcasting.
• To prevent routing attacks, a routing protocol must encrypt and authenticate every
message and packet, not only end-to-end, but also hop-by-hop.
• Some routing protocols have security or efficiency weaknesses.
The Key Management Integrated Routing Protocol starts with a trusted and protected
network. With the secret system parameters, the nodes communicate with each other se-
curely and set up routing table. The only way of communication before routing setup
is broadcasting. The scheme utilizes system parameters of IBC to derive node-specific
1-to-m broadcast keys. These node-specific 1-to-m broadcast keys are used to broadcast
routing messages to all neighbors of a node or all other nodes in the network. The rout-
ing protocol decides the destinations of the routing messages. The node-specific 1-to-m
broadcast keys are essential for secure routing. 1-to-1 keys cannot be used in routing pro-
tocols, because there is no routing between any two nodes. Group-shared m-to-m keys
are not secure enough, because there is no authentication and non-repudiation, and is es-
pecially vulnerable to compromise because one compromised key reveals all encrypted
messages for that group.
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Based on limited distribution of system parameters and the integrated 1-to-m broad-
cast keys, a secure routing can be set up. In this scheme, a 1-to-m broadcast key is avail-
able for each node at the routing setup phase thanks to good features of IBC. Combining
the use of 1-to-m broadcast keys and private keys provides confidentiality, integrity, au-
thentication and non-repudiation at routing setup phase. Compared to previous IBC solu-
tions, this proposal can setup secure routing without the KM-SR interdependency cycle,
while the amount of data distributed remains almost the same. In this scheme, secure
keys are available before a routing protocol starts working, so that a secure routing that
meets the requirements mentioned in Section 2.2 can be set up. To prevent routing at-
tacks, such as wormhole and blackhole, the routing protocol encrypts and authenticates
every message and packet, not only end-to-end, but also hop-by-hop.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the basic idea of the proposed scheme and the difference between
the previous schemes and the proposed scheme. In previous schemes, there are three steps
to set up routing and we see four problems in these schemes:
• Interdependency cycle between step 2 and 3.
• There is no protection in secure key setup messages, thus generated keys are not
guaranteed secure.
• The system is subject to potential insider attacks, because initial nodes are not au-
thenticated.
• The system is subject to mobile attacks, and can be taken over by the adversary [97].
The key point here is integrated key generation. There is no explicit key exchange mes-
sages or key generation phase. Step 2 of previous solutions is total unnecessary. And
secure routing is ready to start immediately after system parameter distribution, and all
these 4 problems are addressed in the scheme. The only new requirement is more control
in secret distribution phase to authenticate participating nodes and secure the distribution.
We think it is worthwhile to do a little work at beginning instead of doing a lot later, as an
old saying goes— “Well begun is half done”, let alone for many practical MANETs, this
is not an extra work.
4.2 Secure Key Generation and Secure Routing Setup
The KM-SR integrated scheme comprises a secure routing protocol and integrated secure
keys. Secure routing protocol can be based on any standard routing protocol. In our work,
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we choose to use OLSR protocol. The reasons for choosing OLSR are:
• First, it has high routing efficiency and low traffic overhead by utilizing multipoint
relay (MPR). The core optimization of OLSR is the flooding mechanism for dis-
tributing link state information, which is broadcast in the network by selected MPR
nodes. As a further optimization, only partial link state is diffused in the network.
The OLSR backbone for message flooding is composed of MPRs. Each node selects
its MPRs from its symmetric 1-hop neighbor nodes such that a message emitted by
a node and repeated by the MPR nodes will be received by all 2-hop neighbors.
As a result, in order to achieve a network-wide broadcast, a broadcast transmission
needs only to be repeated by just a subset of the neighbors of a node—this subset
constitutes the MPR set of the node [74].
• Second, it has good extensibility in packet and message format. OLSR allows for
the encapsulation of numerous independent messages as extensions within a single
OLSR packet. Each message contains a common header which allows for neigh-
bouring nodes to correctly accept and retransmit the message back into the network.
Messages are sent into the entire network by using a MPR scheme, and local nodes
prevent duplicate retransmissions of previously processed messages through the use
of duplicate tables. Control traffic in OLSR is exchanged through two different
types of messages: HELLO and TC (Topology Control) messages. HELLO mes-
sages are exchanged periodically among neighbor nodes, in order to detect links to
neighbors and to signal MPR selection. TC messages are periodically flooded to
the entire network, in order to diffuse link state information to all nodes. For both
HELLO and TC messages, it is easy to add new fields (such as signature) in them,
and it is also easy to add new fields (such as signature) or even new messages (we
do not use this feature in this scheme) to an OLSR packet [23].
Secure keys comprise one system public key, one private key per node, one 1-to-m broad-
cast key per node, and one pairwise key per pair—n(n − 1)/2 keys in total. All these
keys are derived from IBC system parameters without any other overhead or any inter-
action between nodes. And each node only needs to store a limited number of secure
parameters.
An off-line system administrator is required for the system setup. The system pa-
rameters are the same as in Boneh-Fraklin’s IBC scheme [10]: Let G1,G2 be two cyclic
groups of order q for some large prime q, where G1 is the group of points of an ellip-
tic curve over Fp and G2 is a subgroup of F∗p2 , and Fp is the finite field with prime p
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elements. eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a symmetric bilinear map between G1 and G2. The
off-line administrator sets the system public key Ppub as sP where s is a random num-
ber in Z∗q , and P is an arbitrary point in E/Fp of order q. The system parameters are
params = 〈p, q, n, P, Ppub, H,H0, H1〉, where H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q is a random oracle hash
function for message signature, H0 : Fp2 → {0, 1}m is a random oracle hash function for
symmetric key generation, and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Fp is a random oracle hash function for
mapping an identity string to a point on E/Fp. For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the off-
line administrator generates the private key dID as dID = sQID, where QID = H1(ID) is
a point in E/Fp mapped from ID, and functions as the public key of ID. Every node gets
the system parameters and its private key from the administrator before the network starts
up. This can be achieved by gathering authentic nodes and distributing secret securely
right before deploying, for example, by face-to-face communication, infra-red, or Radio
Frequency (RF) communication in a small and protected area.
After deployment, nodes start to communicate with each other securely based on fur-
nished secrets. The only means of communication now is broadcasting. A node broad-
casts routing messages protected by a node-specific 1-to-m broadcast key and its private
key. For this purpose, most existing cryptosystems cannot be used, because they are for
1-to-1 communication, i.e. sending a message to a specific recipient. In our case, we
need to send secure routing messages to multiple recipients, in a way that meets all the
security requirements listed in Section 2.2. We propose a encryption/decryption and sig-
nature/verification cryptosystem for this 1-to-m broadcasting scheme. The cryptosystem
is based on work of Boneh et al [13] and Cha et al [18].
A node A generates a 1-to-m broadcast key in this way:
A computes
g = eˆ(dA, P )
k = H0(g
r),
where r ∈R Z∗q and rQA 6=∞ (point at infinity).
Other nodes can compute the key as follows:
gr = eˆ(QA, Ppub)
r
= eˆ(rQA, Ppub) and
k = H0(g
r),
where rQA is attached in the message.
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When node A sends a routing message, A encrypts and signs the message as follows:
• Uses k as encryption key in a symmetric encryption/decryption method such as AES
to encrypt a message M , and gets M ′.
• Node A signs an encrypted message M ′:
– Calculates h = H(M ′).
– Calculates signature σ = (h + r)dA, where r is the same as what was used in
encryption.
– Sets 〈M ′, σ, rQA〉 in the message field of routing message
Node A then encapsulates messages in a packet and signs the packet as what is to be
described shortly and broadcasts it to other nodes. The signature of a packet is attached
in the packet. Figure 4.2(a) illustrates an OLSR packet with packet header, signature, and
encrypted and signed messages. Figure 4.2(b) illustrates an OLSR message with message
header, signature, and encrypted and signed message content.
In OLSR, after a routing message packet is broadcasted, each node that has received it
disassembles it and reassembles a new packet if there exists any message to be forwarded,
for example the TC message, and may need to modify some mutable fields, such as Time
To Live (TTL) and Hop Count (HC) fields. Therefore, we need a packet signed by its
sender, either the originator or the forwarder of messages. The signature of a packet is
generated using the private key of the packet sender, for example B signs a packet P as
follows:
• Calculates h = H(P).
• Calculates signature σ = (h+ r)dB, where r ∈R Z∗q and rQB 6=∞.
• Puts 〈σ, rQB〉 in the packet signature field of the packet.
In our scheme, when a node receives a packet P ′ from node B, it verifies the signature
in the way described below:
• Calculate h = H(P ′), and hQB .
• Calculate if eˆ(P, σ) = eˆ(P, (h+ r)dB) = eˆ(Ppub, (hQB + rQB)) holds.
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(a) A protected OLSR packet
(b) A protected OLSR message
Figure 4.2: Protected OLSR Packet and Message
CHAPTER 4. A NOVEL KM-SR INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 51
If the signature is valid, it further processes messages in the packet. It checks message
header, and accepts messages destined to it, and re-broadcasts messages to others if any.
For an accepted message 〈M ′, σ, rQA〉 from node A, a node verifies and decrypts the
message as follows:
• Verifies the signature:
– Calculate h = H(M ′), and hQA.
– Calculate if eˆ(P, σ) = eˆ(P, (h+ r)dA) = eˆ(Ppub, (hQA + rQA)) holds.
• If the signature of a message is valid, it calculates the 1-to-m broadcast key k of the
message originator as explained earlier, and processes the message.
With the authenticated routing messages, the nodes in the network can set up a routing
table among them using the shortest path algorithm as specified in standard OLSR proto-
col.
4.3 Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we proposed a novel IBC framework with key management and secure
routing integrated scheme that addresses interdependency between these two aspects. The
scheme starts with a constant number of initial secrets to be furnished on participating
nodes. From the initial secrets, each node derives a 1-to-m broadcast key. Nodes can
then broadcast routing messages that are protected by the 1-to-m broadcast key and its
specific private key. This is a pure IBC scheme with no key management and secure
routing interdependency cycle. In the next few chapters, we will analyze security features
and performance of the framework, and enhancements against various attacks, limitations
and weaknesses of IBC itself.
Chapter 5
Security Analysis and Enhancements of
the Framework
In this chapter, we prove the security of the scheme theoretically, and analyze security
features of this framework. Enhancements against various attacks are also discussed in
this chapter.
5.1 Security features and proof
Security of the proposed scheme is based on assumptions well-established and theorems
proved in this paper.
Assumption 1 System parameters are distributed only to authentic nodes of the net-
work and kept secret to adversaries at least until routing is set up.
Assumption 2 AES cryptosystem used in this scheme is hard enough, so that an ad-
versary cannot break the system and learn the plaintext if s/he does not know the key.
Assumption 3 Static Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem is hard in group G1, i.e.: Given
(P,Q, aP ) for P,Q ∈ G1 and for some a ∈ Z∗q , there is no efficient algorithm to compute
aQ.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumption 3 is true and the hash functions are random oracles.
The signature scheme in Section 4.2 is secure against existential forgery under an adaptive
chosen-message attack.
Proof. We prove the security of the signature scheme against existential forgery under
adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model. Existential unforgeability
under a chosen-message attack [40] for a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, and Verify) is
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defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
• Setup. The challenger runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public key PK and private
key SK. The adversary A is given PK.
• Queries. Proceeding adaptively,A requests signatures with PK on at most qS mes-
sages of his/her choice M1, ..., Mqs ∈ {0, 1}∗. The challenger responds to each
query with a signature σi = Sign(SK,Mi).
• Output. Eventually,A outputs a tuple 〈M,σ, r ·PK〉 where r is a random number,
and wins the game if
1. M is not any of M1, ..., Mqs .
2. Verify(〈M,σ, r · PK〉) = valid.
We define AdvSigA to be the probability that A wins in the above game, taken over the
coin tosses of KeyGen and of A.
We prove this using proof by contradiction method. Suppose A is a forger algorithm
that breaks the signature scheme with running time τ and AdvSigA = ε. We show how
to construct an algorithm B that solves SDH in G1 with AdvSigB at least ε′ and running
time at most τ ′, for all ε′ and τ ′ satisfying: ε′ ≥ ε
e2(qs+1)2
and τ ′ ≤ τ + c1(qH + 3qS),
where c1 is a constant, e is the base of the natural logarithm, qH is the number of queries
A made to the hash function H , and qS is the number of queries A made for signature.
This will contradict the fact that G1 is a SDH group which is given by Assumption 3.
Let P be a generator of G1, s ∈R Z∗q is the master key kept secret to A and B.
Algorithm B is given P, sP ∈ G1. B’s goal is to output sQ′A ∈ G1 given a random point
Q′A = rAQA in G1 (without knowing rA).
Setup. AlgorithmB starts by givingA P and system public key (s+r′)P = sP+r′P
where r′ ∈R Z∗q .
H-queries. When A queries the oracle H at a point Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, algorithm B
responds as follows:
1. If the query already appears on the H-list in a tuple 〈Mi, wi, bi, ci〉 then algorithm
B responds with H(Mi) = wi ∈ Z∗q
2. Otherwise, B generates a random coin ci ∈ {0, 1} so that Pr [ci = 0] = 1/(qS +1).
3. Algorithm B picks a random bi ∈ Z∗q and computes wi ← (1− ci) + bi ∈ Z∗q
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4. AlgorithmB adds the tuple 〈Mi, wi, bi, ci〉 to theH-list and responds toA by setting
H(Mi) = wi.
Identity-mapping-queries. For any given identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗, Algorithm B uses
the random oracle H to produce the corresponding point Qi on G1:
1. Algorithm B runs H-queries to obtain a vi ∈ Z∗q such that H(IDi) = vi. Let
〈IDi, vi, ji, ki〉 be the corresponding tuple on the H-list. If ki = 0 then B reports
failure and terminates.
2. Otherwise, we know ki = 1 and hence vi = (1 − ki) + ji = ji ∈ Z∗q . Define
Qi = viP .
3. Output Qi.
Signature-queries. Let Mi be a signature query issued by A with identity IDi. Al-
gorithm B responds to this query as follows:
1. AlgorithmB runs Identity-mapping-queries to obtain aQi ∈ G1. Let 〈IDi, vi, ji, ki〉
be the corresponding tuple on the H-list. We have Qi = jiP .
2. Algorithm B runs H-queries to obtain a wi ∈ G1 such that H(Mi) = wi. Let
〈Mi, wi, bi, ci〉 be the corresponding tuple on the H-list. If ci = 0 then B reports
failure and terminates.
3. Otherwise, we know ki = 1 and hence vi = ji ∈ Z∗q , and ci = 1 and hence
wi = bi ∈ Z
∗
q .
4. Define σi = (s+ r′)(wiQi + riQi), where ri ∈R Z∗q . Algorithm B generates ri and
calculates σi:
∵ Qi = viP , ∴ σi = (s + r
′)(wiQi + riQi) = (s + r
′)(wi + ri)(viP ) = (wi +
ri)(visP ) + (wi + ri)(vir
′P ).
Observe that eˆ(P, (s+r′)(wiQi+riQi)) = eˆ((s+r′)P, (wiQi+riQi)) and therefore
σi is a valid signature on Mi under the public key (s+ r′)P for Qi.
5. Algorithm B gives message signature tuple 〈Mi, σi, riQi〉 to algorithm A.
Output. Eventually algorithmA produces a message signature tuple 〈MA, σA, rAQA〉
for IDA such that no signature query and identity-mapping-query were issued for MA and
IDA (as we supposed existential forgery is possible at the beginning of the proof).
CHAPTER 5. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ENHANCEMENTS 55
If there is no tuple on the H-list containing MA, then B issues a signature query itself
for H(MA) to ensure that such a tuple exists. If there is no tuple on the H-list containing
IDA, then B issues a signature query itself for H(IDA) to ensure that such a tuple exists.
We assume σA is a valid signature on MA for IDA under the given public key. If it is
not, B reports failure and terminates.
Next, algorithm B finds the tuple 〈MA, w, b, c〉 and 〈IDA, v, j, k〉 on the H-list.
If c = 1 or k = 1, B reports failure and terminates.
Otherwise c = 0 and k = 0, and therefore w = H(MA) = 1 + b and v = H(IDA) =
1 + j.
Hence, according to definition of σ, after step 3 of the signature query, B knows σA =
(s + r′)(wQA + rAQA) = (s + r
′)[(1 + b)QA + rAQA], and according to definition of
QA, sQA = s(vP ) = s(1+ j)P = (1+ j)(sP ), and then outputs s(rAQA) as s(rAQA) =
σA − r
′(rAQA)− (1 + b)r
′QA − (1 + b)(1 + j)(sP ).
This completes the description of algorithm B.
To determine the probability ε′ that algorithm B solves the SDH problem, we analyze
the three events for algorithm B to succeed:
1. E1: B does not abort as a result of any of A’s signature queries.
2. E2: A generates a valid message-signature forgery 〈MA, σA, rAQA〉.
3. E3: Event E2 occurs and c = 0 for the tuple containing MA on the H-list.
B succeeds if all of these events happen. The probability Pr[E1 ∧ E3] is
Pr[E1 ∧ E3] = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2|E1] · Pr[E3|E2 ∧ E1] (5.1)
The following claims give a lower bound for each of these terms.
Claim 1. The probability that algorithm B does not abort as a result of algorithmA’s
signature queries is at least 1/e2. Hence Pr[E1] ≥ 1/e2
Proof. According to the definition of signature-query above, for a signature query to fail,
the possibility is that it fails in a H-query to obtain a wi ∈ G1 such that H(Mi) = wi,
or it fails in a H-query to obtain a vi ∈ G1 such that H(IDi) = vi. In either failure, the
probability is Pr[ci = 0] = 1/(qS + 1) or Pr[ki = 0] = 1/(qS + 1). The probability of
no failure is thus Pr[ci = 1] = 1− 1/(qS + 1) or Pr[ki = 1] = 1− 1/(qS + 1).
Since A makes at most qS signature queries, the probability that B does not abort as a
result of H(Mi) = wi is at least Pr[H(Mi) = wi] = Pr[ci = 1] = (1− 1/(qS + 1))qS ≥
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1/e, and the probability that B does not abort as a result of H(IDi) = vi is at least
Pr[H(IDi) = vi] = Pr[ki = 1] = (1− 1/(qS + 1))
qS ≥ 1/e.
Hence, the probability thatB does not abort in aH-query is at least Pr[E1] = Pr[H(Mi) =
wi] · Pr[H(IDi) = vi] ≥ 1/e · 1/e = 1/e
2
.
Claim 2. If algorithm B does not abort as a result of algorithmA’s signature queries
then algorithm A’s view is identical to its view in the real attack. Hence, Pr[E2|E1] ≥ ε.
Proof. The public key given to A is from the same distribution as a public key produced
in Setup step. Responses to H-queries are as in the real attack since each response is
uniformly and independently distributed in G1. All responses to signature queries are
valid. Therefore, A will produce a valid message-signature tuple with probability at least
ε. Hence, Pr[E2|E1] ≥ ε.
Claim 3. The probability that algorithm B does not abort after algorithm B outputs a
valid forgery is at least 1/(qS + 1)2. Hence, Pr[E3|E2 ∧ E1] = 1/(qS + 1)2.
Proof. Given that events E1 and E2 happened, algorithm B will abort only if A gener-
ates a forgery signature tuple 〈MA, σA, rAQA〉 for which the tuple 〈MA, w, b, c〉 on the
H-list has c = 1 or the tuple 〈IDA, v, j, k〉 on the H-list has k = 1. c and k are in-
dependent of A’s current view. Therefore, according to the generation function of ci
and ki, Pr [c = 0|E1 ∧ E2] = 1/(qS + 1), and Pr [k = 0|E1 ∧ E2] = 1/(qS + 1). Hence,
Pr [E3|E1 ∧ E2] = 1/(qS + 1)
2 as required.
Combining the bounds from the claims above in Equation 5.1 shows that algorithm
B produces the correct answer with probability AdvSigB = ε′ ≥ εe2(qs+1)2 as required.
B’s running time is the same as A’s running time plus the time it takes to respond to qS
signature queries, and 2qS + qH H-queries (each signature query calls H-query twice).
Each query requires a constant time c1. Hence, the total running time is at most τ ′ ≤
τ + c1(qH + 3qS) as required. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 resembles the method and procedure used in [13].
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 1 is true. The 1-to-m broadcast key k in Section 4.2
is only known to authentic nodes.
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Proof. The 1-to-m broadcast key is k = H0(gr). To get k, one needs to know gr. Since
gr = eˆ(dA, P )
= eˆ(QA, Ppub)
r
= eˆ(rQA, Ppub)
There are three ways to calculate gr:
• Know dA and P .
• Know QA, Ppub and r.
• Know rQA and Ppub.
For an adversary, QA and rQA are publicly known from a message or packet; dA,
P and Ppub are unknown according to Assumption 1; r cannot be calculated from rQA
according to discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves. Only from QA or rQA, an
adversary cannot deduce k.
Based on the above assumptions and theorem, it is clear that the proposed scheme
provides confidentiality, integrity, authentication, freshness and non-repudiation.
• Confidentiality: All routing messages are encrypted using the 1-to-m broadcast key.
To decrypt the message, an entity needs to know decryption key k. According to
Theorem 2 and Assumption 3.2, an adversary cannot calculate the key and cannot
decrypt the message without a correct key.
• Integrity: All routing messages and packets are signed by message originators and
packet senders. The recipients verify the signature of routing packets and messages
before accepting them. Since the hash function is collision resistant, an altered
image cannot go through with an unchanged signature. Thus the integrity is verified.
• Authentication: All routing messages are signed by the originators. According to
Theorem 1, an adversary not knowing the private key of a node cannot generate a
valid signature; thus a message with a valid signature can authenticate the identity
of the originator of the message. For the same reason, an adversary cannot forge a
message with a valid signature, and authenticity of messages is ensured.
• Freshness: Since all routing messages are signed by the originators, according to
Theorem 1, an adversary cannot forge a message or modify any part of a message.
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With a timestamp inside a message and system-wide synchronization, a replayed
message or an out-of-order message can be easily differentiated from original one.
The freshness of routing messages can be ensured.
• Non-repudiation: A routing message is signed by the originator using its private
key, and a routing packet is signed by a packet sender using its private key. The
private key is only known by exactly one node. According to Theorem 1, any other
node or any adversary cannot forge a signature on a message and identity; thus the
node that has generated or forwarded and signed the message cannot deny signing
the message.
5.2 Supporting Threshold Cryptography without Mobile
Attacks
Threshold cryptography is of great importance to IBC: Many IBC schemes use it for key
generation and update/refresh, for addressing identity disclosure and key escrow prob-
lems, or for dynamic membership management. We need to support threshold cryptog-
raphy because we might need some of these features in some circumstances. However,
as we descripted in Chapter 3, threshold cryptography has three issues when used in IBC
schemes.
• Interdependency cycle between secure routing and key management: The KM-SR
integrated framework has addressed this issue.
• Proximity-caused insecurity: Since there is no KM-SR interdependency cycle, there
is no need to bring a threshold number of PKG nodes in a proximity, and there is
no proximity-caused insecurity.
• Mobile attacks: This is the only remaining issue we need to tackle in this section.
In mobile attacks, a mobile adversary could move to compromise multiple nodes and
reveal the secret shares of them in order to recover the secret. To counter mobile attacks,
many proposals use secret refreshing mechanism in which secret shares are updated in
intervals and new shares cannot be combined with old ones to recover the secret, e.g.
[99]. They assume a mobile adversary cannot compromise enough authentic nodes within
the share refreshing period. We do not think this assumption is practical, as suggested by
Merwe et al in [65]. We also see some loopholes in this solution against mobile attacks:
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1. If there are more than one mobile adversaries in a (n, t+1) threshold cryptosystem,
they can compromise t + 1 nodes and reveal t + 1 shares within one refreshing
interval, and collude to recover the secret.
2. A single adversary can compromise a node at one time, leave a backdoor, and read
new shares later, if the compromised node has not been detected and revoked in
time. Then in a refreshing interval, the adversary does not need to compromise
t+ 1 nodes, but only need to collect t + 1 shares. This saves a great magnitude of
time and makes it possible for the adversary to win the game.
Once the system master key is recovered, the adversary can induct new adversary nodes
by generating legal private keys for them, masquerade authentic nodes, and launch Sybil
attacks. They can even take over the entire network.
5.2.1 Enhancement against Mobile Attack
Based on the KM-SR integrated framework, we propose an enhancement that refreshes or
updates master key and private keys so that the mobile attackers cannot compromise these
keys. The assumption of the scheme is a cooperative ad-hoc network in which identities
of nodes are authenticated by the TA and system parameters are distributed by the PKG
before dispatching, so that the initial status of the network is secure.
Previous solutions suggest dividing system master key among all online nodes or a
small group of them. The mobile attackers can recover the master key by compromising
a number of nodes holding the secret shares above the threshold. To improve security,
the basic idea of our scheme is that the secret is divided into two parts: static part and
dynamic part. At any time after the dynamic part has been generated, the working system
master key is the combination of static part and dynamic part. The static part is kept
offline, so that adversaries cannot locate and compromise that part. The dynamic part is
generated and refreshed online as previous solutions do.The online nodes do not know the
static part, so the mobile adversaries cannot get that part even if they compromise enough
number of the online nodes.
With the KM-SR integrated framework proposed in previous chapter, when the net-
work starts up, nodes start exchanging routing messages. Eventually, a secure routing is
set up using routing messages protected by the initial secret. To avoid key compromise
by mobile attackers, we update the master key s, system public key Ppub, and private key
of each node corresponding to s. The new master key is updated with two parts: static
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part—ssta that is always equal to initial master key s generated by the offline adminis-
trator, and dynamic part—sdyn generated by all nodes contributively. New system public
key and private keys are determined by the new master key. We use (n, t + 1) threshold
cryptography to generate sdyn so that sdyn can then be recovered by t + 1 nodes out of n
nodes who participated in the generation. This increases availability of key generation or
update in a dynamically changing network environment.
After the initial secure routing is set up, nodes can communicate with each other using
pairwise communication. Since there is no more KM-SM interdependency cycle, the
previous key management schemes (such as those in [99] and [28]) are applicable. Nodes
can now update their private keys on-line, to fight against crypto-analysis against initial
secrets, or to fight against mobile attacks. To this end, we suggest dividing the master key,
system public key, or a private key into a static part and a dynamic part, and updating the
dynamic part only. The static part is the initial master key, system public key, or the initial
private key.
Assume there are n nodes in the initial network. Each node Ci randomly chooses
a secret ki and a polynomial fi(z) over Zq of degree t, such that fi(0) = ki. Node
Ci computes his sub-share for node Cj as ssij = fi(j) for j = 1, 2...n and sends ssij
securely to Cj using pairwise secret key (KAB = eˆ(dA, QB) = eˆ(dB, QA) = KBA)
or secret session key (for example, the session key generation in [45]). After receiving
n − 1 sub-shares, node Cj can compute its share of dynamic part of master key sdyn as
Sj =
∑n
i=1 ssij =
∑n
i=1 fi(j). Any coalition of t+1 shareholders (assume the t+1 nodes
form a set T) can jointly generate a new secret key sdyn as in basic secret sharing [99]:
sdyn =
t+1∑
i=1
Sili(x)|x=0 (mod q), (5.2)
where li(x) =
Q
j 6=i(x−xj)Q
j 6=i(xi−xj)
, (i, j ∈ T) is the Lagrange coefficient, xi and xj are node in-
dexes derived from node identities. Due to the homomorphic property of share refreshing,
the jointly generated dynamic part of master key is sdyn =
∑n
i=1 ki =
∑n
i=1 fi(0).
For each initial node with identity IDi in the network to get the new system public
key P ′pub and refresh its private key d′i, it contacts t nodes using pairwise secret keys. Each
of the t nodes generates for the requesting node a secret share of the dynamic part of
system public key SiP , and new dynamic part of private key SiQi, using its own share of
dynamic part of master key—Si, and sends them to the requesting node. After collecting
t shared secrets from other nodes separately and generating its own share, the (t + 1)-th
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share, the requesting node can calculate the new dynamic part of system public key
Ppubdyn =
t+1∑
i=1
[(Si · P ) · li(x)|x=0]
=
t+1∑
i=1
[(Si · P )
∏
j 6=i(−xj)∏
j 6=i(xi − xj)
]
(5.3)
and its new dynamic part of private key
didyn =
t+1∑
i=1
[(Si ·Qi) · li(x)|x=0]
=
t+1∑
i=1
[(Si ·Qi)
∏
j 6=i(−xj)∏
j 6=i(xi − xj)
].
(5.4)
Note that Ppubdyn =
∑n
i=1 fi(0) · P = sdyn · P and didyn =
∑n
i=1 fi(0) ·Qi = sdyn ·Qi. It
then combines the parts from t nodes and its initial system parameters to get the system
public key and its private key. As a result, the new master key is
s′ = s+ sdyn; (5.5)
the new system public key is
P ′pub = Ppub + Ppubdyn; (5.6)
and the new private key of node i is
d′i = di + didyn . (5.7)
Note that the new master key s′ actually does not exist on any node. We show it just for
explaining the new public key and new private key. The initial public key Ppub (now the
static part of new public key) is kept by all nodes so that the offline administrator can sign
a message using its initial private key and other nodes can verify it using the initial public
key. This is useful when the off-line administrator admits a new node to join the network.
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5.2.2 Support for Dynamic Membership
When a new node with ID IDp needs to join, its public key is explicit as Qp = H1(IDp).
What it needs to get is system public key and its private key. The question here is that the
new node knows nothing about the latest secret among authentic nodes then and cannot
join their communication, and the authentic nodes cannot judge if the new node is an
adversary or not. To tackle this question, the offline administrator is essential. The new
node first contacts the offline administrator and gets the initial system public key Ppub
(now the static part of new public key), its initial private key dp (now the static part of
its private key), and an “entrance ticket” signed by the administrator using its private key.
The new node then contacts t+1 nodes, presents the “entrance ticket” that can be verified
using the initial system public key (now the static part of new system public key), and
gets t + 1 shares of the dynamic part of system public key Ppubdyn , and dynamic part of
its private key dpdyn. Since the secure routing is already established, the new node can
communicate with remote nodes through its neighbors. It then combines the dynamic
part of system public key and dynamic part of private key with initial ones (static parts),
as explained above: P ′pub = Ppub + Ppubdyn and d′p = dp + dpdyn.
One thing needing to note is that the new node does not have a share of dynamic part of
master key sdyn, Sp, as original nodes. This may deteriorate the usability or performance
of threshold cryptography in the long run, since if n − t original nodes have left the
network or died at some time, there are not enough nodes to accept new nodes, and the
network can no longer be autonomous or self-organizing. To generate new shares of
dynamic part of master key sdyn, each of the t+1 nodes, holding secret share Si, generates
for new node p a new share from its own share using Lagrange polynomial: Si · li(p) =
Si ·
Q
j 6=i(xp−xj)Q
j 6=i(xi−xj)
. After receiving t+1 shares from these nodes, the new node can calculate
its own share simply by summing up these shares: Sp =
∑t+1
i=1 Sili(p). At this point, the
new node has no difference than the initial nodes, and can join the network communication
and secret updates.
When a node leaves the network, nothing needs to be done unless the number of
remaining nodes approaches t + 1 in which situation a new lower t + 1 is determined at
each node by calculating on the number of nodes in the routing table. For a returning
node that leaves the network temporarily, it needs to check the version of keys when
returning. If its version is not the latest, it needs to go through the procedure for a new
node; otherwise it can return and join directly.
To ensure the consistency of the system public key and private keys, we suggest each
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secret share have an attached sequential number count for each secret update. Only shares
with the same sequential numbers can generate new keys collaboratively. In this scheme,
each node can get the system public key and its new private key, without master key being
revealed to any node. The adversaries cannot get the master key unless they compromise
both the offline administrator and at least t+ 1 online nodes.
5.2.3 A Working Example of the Scheme
We design an example to illustrate the scheme. Assume there are 5 initial nodes, and the
initial master key generated by offline administrator (i.e. the static part of master key) is
6. The contributions of a new dynamic part of master key by initial nodes are shown in
Table 5.1. The procedure of generating shares of dynamic part of master private key is
shown in Table 5.2.
Node Secret and Polynomial
1 5 + 10x+ x2
2 12 + 20x+ 2x2
3 15 + 30x+ 3x2
4 18 + 40x+ 4x2
5 22 + 50x+ 5x2
Dynamic Part of
Master Key
5 + 12 + 15 + 18 + 22 = 72
Table 5.1: Contributions of Dynamic Part of a New Master Key
Node Sub-shares from Node (ssij) Share of
Master Key
1 2 3 4 5 (
5∑
i=1
ssij)
1 16 34 48 62 77 237
2 29 60 87 114 142 432
3 44 90 132 174 217 657
4 61 124 183 242 302 912
5 80 162 240 318 397 1197
Table 5.2: Sub-shares and Shares of Dynamic Part of a New Master Key
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New
Node
Share of Dynamic Part of Master Key New
Share
1 2 3 4 5
1-5 237 432 657 912 1197 -
6 144 -1824 3192 1512
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 5.3: New Node (6) Gets Its Share of Dynamic Part of Master Key
To recover the dynamic part of the master key from 3 nodes, say 2,4,5, using (3, 5)
threshold cryptosystem, these nodes first calculate Lagrange polynomials then the dy-
namic part of new master key sdyn =
∑3
i=1 Sili(0) = 432·l1(0)+912·l2(0)+1197·l3(0) =
72. And the new master key is s′ = 72 + 6 = 78.
When a new node Node-6 joins the network, it gets its static part from offline admin-
istrator, and share of dynamic part of new master key calculated from shares of node 2, 4,
5, as is shown in Table 5.3.
5.3 Enhancement against Blackhole Attacks
In blackhole attacks, an adversary node advertises itself as having the shortest path to
some other nodes, and then receives the traffic to these nodes. The adversary then can
choose to drop the traffic or redirect it to nodes pretending to be the destination. There
are two cases in this type of attacks:
5.3.1 Without Compromised Nodes
This type of attacks can be prevented by the KM-SR integrated framework already: an
adversary node cannot advertise forged routing messages to other nodes, because it cannot
forge the required signature.
5.3.2 With Compromised Nodes
If there are some nodes compromised, the adversary can advertise forged routing mes-
sages using the authentic identity and signature of a compromised node. To fight against
this attack, we can verify a routing information with its neighbor’s attestation or certificate
assuming its neighbor is not compromised. We need some extension in routing messages:
CHAPTER 5. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ENHANCEMENTS 65
At beginning of routing setup, each empty HELLO message (the initial HELLO message
before neighbor recognized) has its key information (such as timestamp) and originator
address signed by the originator, and attach the key information and signature in the mes-
sage (originator address is implicit in the message). Later, each HELLO message carries
updated key information and signature, and each neighbor advertised in a HELLO or TC
message is accompanied with the key information and signature from the original HELLO
message from that neighbor (the advertised neighbor is the originator when verifying the
signature).
This scheme is a simplified version of Raffo’s [74]. In his proposal, neighbor’s attesta-
tion is updated for each update of link status, so that attestation is nested and can be very
large. For example, a neighbor information in a HELLO message with SYM_NEIGHBOR
link status needs to include attestation for a HELLO message with SYM_LINK link status
which needs again to include attestation for a HELLO message with ASYM_LINK link
status. Finally, a neighbor information in a HELLO message with SYM_NEIGHBOR link
status needs 3 key information fields and 3 attestations; otherwise, blackhole attacks could
be successfully launched. In our scheme, we only include one attestation—the original
one from that neighbor, and require that a symmetric link can be set up only when both
ends of the link provide valid attestations from each other in their TC messages; in this
way, a false HELLO message does not lead to a false route.
Figure 5.1(a) and Figure 5.1(b) show the structure of a HELLO message and a TC
message with neighbor’s attestations.
If there are enough nodes compromised in the network so that they can collude to
forge false routing advertisement, per-advertisement signature is insufficient to detect the
attack. We will need measures against denial-of-service attacks to be discussed shortly.
5.4 Against Wormhole Attacks
In wormhole attacks, adversaries can collude to transport routing packets out of band. In a
routing packet, there are two types of routing messages: the local messages and the global
messages. The global messages are meant to be propagandized to all nodes; so wormhole
attacks to these messages are not harmful, but actually favorable. Only messages that
are meant to be exchanged locally, for example, neighbor advertisement, should not be
distributed out of neighborhood. To detect the local routing messages distributed out-of-
neighborhood, we can use time-based method and location-based method.
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(a) OLSR HELLO message with neighbor’s attestations
(b) OLSR TC message with neighbor’s attestations
Figure 5.1: Structure of OLSR HELLO and TC Message with Neigbor’s Attestations
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• Time-based method If precise timestamps is available in routing messages, our
KM-SR framework has them signed in the message by the message originators. A
packet from a previous time or a different place which travels through more hops
bears a previous timestamp, and can be easily distinguished from correct ones.
• Location-based method In MANETs where GPS or other locating devices are
equipped on nodes, location-based method can be used to fight against wormhole
attacks. In one of our previous work, we designed an OLSR plug-in Deployment
Information (DI) message to exchange deployment information. The specification
of the DI message can be found in our previous paper [98], but we present a short
summary here. Figure 5.2(a) shows the structure of the DI message which includes:
– Node Location & Velocity
– Node Deployment Profile: The deployment profile serial number is used to
indicate the current deployment profile that is configured in the node.
– Node Status Information: Node Status Information field is used to carry alarms
to the Deployment Tool. Such alarms include equipment malfunctions and
configurable alarms specified in the node deployment profile.
– Number of Neighbours: The Number Of Neighbors field is the number of one-
hop neighbours for which there is a link quality measurement result available.
– Neighbour Information Block: A Neighbour Information Block (see Figure
5.2(b)) contains a one-hop neighbour description. There is a neighbourhood
information block for each one hop neighbour, and the neighbourhood infor-
mation block has two fields:
∗ The Neighbour ID identifies the one-hop neighbour. In our implementa-
tion, we used IPv4 address as an identifier. We assume that the addresses
are allocated and configured in advance.
∗ The Link Quality Parameter describes the level of connection to the neigh-
bour based on link measurement.
Although this DI message plug-in was not originally designed for security purpose, it pro-
vides enough information to fight against wormhole attacks if put in use in our proposed
KM-SR integrated framework.
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(a) The Structure of the DI Message (b) Neighbour Information Block
Figure 5.2: OLSR Deployment Information Message
5.5 Against Other Routing Attacks
With or without modification or addition, the scheme is also immune to the following
attacks:
• Spoofing and Sybil Attacks: With this type of attacks, an adversary node attempts
to take over the identity of another node. These attacks can be prevented by authen-
tication feature of the cryptographic scheme.
• Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis: Due to wireless communication features of
MANETs, an adversary may eavesdrop and analyze traffic in the air. This type of
attacks are prevented by confidentiality feature of the scheme.
• Modifying a routing message or packet: An adversary may try to modify a rout-
ing message or packet content to propagandize false routing information. This is
prevented by integrity feature of the scheme.
• Denial-of-service Attacks: Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can be applied by ad-
versaries on various layers of an MANET system to block proper transmission of
legitimate traffic. In general MANETs, one type of DoS attacks is adversary nodes
advertising false or true routing messages and participating in routing setup but ac-
tually not in traffic forwarding, thus leads to network malfunction. This type of at-
tacks are not possible in our KM-SR integrated framework, because authentication
of nodes and messages prevents this behavior by adversaries. Nevertheless, some
behaviors of authentic nodes may have also this effect (e.g. Selfishness described
below). Another type of DoS attacks is to propagandize false routing messages
that are meant to consume limited communication and computational resources of
authentic nodes.
CHAPTER 5. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ENHANCEMENTS 69
On network and application layers, monitoring and accusation systems are effective
countermeasures against DoS attacks. The proposed framework does not provide a
monitoring and accusation system by itself, but provides a solid bedrock for such a
system.
• Selfishness: This is actually not an attack, but rather a malfunction of some nodes
of the system. An authentic node may have some reasons not to forward traffic
that it should forward, for example, to save its energy, or it is just blocked in some
specific terrain. The effect of selfishness is similar to denial-of-service attacks. This
type of attacks can be detected and prevented with the measures used against denial-
of-service attacks in which selfish nodes are treated equally as adversary nodes.
• Rushing Attacks: In reactive routing protocols, to limit the overhead of flooding,
each node typically forwards only one ROUTE REQUEST originating from any
Route Discovery. If the ROUTE REQUESTs for this Discovery forwarded by the
attacker are the first to reach each neighbor of the target, then any route discovered
by this Route Discovery will include a hop through the attacker ( this is because
when a neighbor of the target receives the rushed REQUEST from the attacker, it
forwards that REQUEST, and will not forward any further REQUESTs from this
Route Discovery.) Thus if the adversary forwards route request faster than valid
ones, then the discovered route would include the adversary. This only applies to
reactive routing protocols. In our scheme, we choose a proactive routing protocl
and do not have to worry about this type of attacks.
• Record-and-replay Attacks: A node can record a message or a packet from some
place and replay it somewhere else, or record a packet at some time and replay it
some time later.
Record-and-replay attacks on message level are not available in the proposed KM-
SR integrated framework, since every packet is signed and verified and there is no
possibility to replace a message in a packet. If we only signed the messages but
not the packets, the adversary would be able to apply record-and-replay attacks by
replacing a message with a recorded valid message.
On packet level, the adversary may record and replay an entire packet which con-
tains inappropriate routing messages. To detect an out-of-order message, the mes-
sage sequence number in a message is meant for this. To detect an out-of-date
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routing message, we can include in the signed routing messages time-based infor-
mation. To detect a local routing message distributed out-of-neighborhood is sim-
ilar to detecting wormhole attacks, we can use location-based information as was
described in Section 5.4.
5.6 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented proof of security of the cryptographic scheme of the framework,
analysis of the security features of the framework, and immunity and enhancements
against various attacks. Performance-related issues will be discussed in the next chap-
ter.
Chapter 6
Simulation Results and Performance
Analysis of the Framework
In this chapter, we analyze computational complexity of the cryptographic scheme and
efficiency of the KM-SR framework from perspectives of transmission overhead and end-
to-end delay. We also demonstrate performance of the framework with practical sim-
ulation. For scalability, we give an evaluation model according to communication and
computational overhead per node.
6.1 Computational Complexity and Efficiency Analysis
The encryption/decryption and signature/verification schemes used in our KM-SR frame-
work are of high efficiency and low complexity, compared to other existing cryptographic
schemes.
• Encryption: The 1-to-m broadcast encryption key generation takes 1 pairing com-
putation, 1 exponentiation computation, and 1 hash computation. Note that the most
time-consuming pairing computation eˆ(dA, P ) can be precomputed once and for all
so that encryption requires no pairing computation. Encryption is fast due to use of
symmetric key cryptography.
• Decryption: The 1-to-m broadcast decryption key generation takes 1 pairing com-
putation and 1 hash computation. Decryption is fast due to use of symmetric key
cryptography.
• Signature: The signature operation takes 1 hash computation, 2 scalar multiplica-
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tion computation. One optimization of the scheme is to use a fixed r for each QA
and save rQA for QA. This saves both communication and computational resource,
with sacrifice of storage space.
• Verification: The verification operation takes 1 hash computation, 1 scalar multipli-
cation computation, and 2 pairing computation.
Comparison to existing cryptographic schemes is summarized in Table 6.1 and Ta-
ble 6.2
Our
Scheme
BF [10] HIDE [39] DHIDE [39] IBEWOR
[11]
Encryption 1E+1H+1X 1E+2H+1P
+1M+1X
1E+2H+1M
+1P+1E
1E+2H+1M
+1P+1X
1E+5M
Decryption 1H+1P+1X 1H+1P+1X 1H+1P+1X 1H+1P+1X 1A+1I+1M
Computations: A—addintion, H—hashing, I—inversion, E—exponentiation,
M—scalar multiplication, P—pairing, X—XOR (To compare fairly on the
same security level, we evaluate with XOR instead of AES in our scheme here.)
Table 6.1: Comparison of Our Encryption/Decryption Scheme with Others
Our
Scheme
BLS [14] BSS [9] MSS [9] AGG [12] ZSS [90]
Signature 1H+2M 1H+1M 1H+3M 1H+1M 1H+1M 1H+1I
+1M
Verification 1A+1H+
1M+2P
1H+2P 1H+2P 2P 1H+2P 1A+1H
+1M+2P
Computations: A—addintion, H—hashing, I—inversion,
M—scalar multiplication, P—pairing
Table 6.2: Comparison of Our Singature/Verification Scheme with Others
From these tables we can see that our encryption/decryption scheme is among the
highest efficient ones, and our signature/verification scheme is just slightly worse than the
highest efficient ones. As a side note, we have considered the highest efficient schemes
and realized that they do not exactly match our key management scheme in MANET
context.
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6.2 Transmission Overhead Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the transmission overhead of the secure routing protocol,
compared to standard OLSR.
6.2.1 IBC Encryption/Signature Overhead in OLSR Packets
The average size of a standard OLSR HELLO packet is 488 + 40n bits, and of a standard
OLSR TC packet is 384+ 32n bits, where n is the number of advertised neighbors of this
node, considering the IPv4 header (160 bits), the UDP header (64 bits), and the OLSR
packet header (32 bits + 96 bits per message) [23, 74]. We assume each OLSR packet
contains only HELLO or TC messages. This is the worst case scenario, as including more
control messages in a packet would reduce the overhead.
In the proposed scheme, a signature is a point on an elliptic curve. To save space,
we can transmit only the x-coordinate and a sign bit. The overhead added by a packet
signature is 512+1=513 bits with 512-bit IBC, and 256+1=257 bits with 256-bit IBC. The
overhead added by a message signature and encryption is 512+1=513 bits with 512-bit
IBC, and 256+1=257 bits with 256-bit IBC. Thus, the size of a packet with a HELLO
message advertising n neighbor nodes is: 513 + 513 + 488 + 40n = 1514 + 40n bits
when using 512-bit IBC, and 257 + 257 + 488 + 40n = 1002 + 40n bits when using
256-bit IBC. The size of a packet with a TC message advertising n neighbor nodes is:
513+513+384+32n = 1410+32n bits when using 512-bit IBC, and 257+257+384+
32n = 898 + 32n bits when using 256-bit IBC. Figure 6.1(a) and Figure 6.1(b) show
the overhead per neighbor in a standard HELLO/TC message and IBC encrypted and
signed HELLO/TC message, in a network with 1 to 40 potential neighbors per node. The
figures demonstrate that overhead for per neighbor advertised decreases dramatically in
all scenarios and the difference between encrypted messages and non-encrypted messages
quickly becomes ignorable when the network size and the number of potential neighbors
per node increase. More intuitively, Figure 6.1(c) and Figure 6.1(d) show the ratio of
IBC scheme overhead per neighbor to standard overhead which is approaching 1 when
n is getting larger. This is because when more neighbors are included in a message,
the overhead of signature of packet and message is shared by more nodes, and per node
overhead is decreased and approaching to standard level. This means that the cost per
node is lower in a dense network (in which each node has more than 20 neighbors) than
in a sparse network.
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Figure 6.1: Transmission Overhead of a OLSR Packet with a HELLO or TC Message
6.2.2 IBC Encryption/Signature and Neighbor’s Attestation Over-
head in OLSR Packets
The transmission overhead added by neighbor’s attestation is large. For each neighbor
advertised, a key information and signature are attached (originator address is implicit in
the message). Assume we use a 32-bit timestamp as key information, and 513 or 257
bits for signature. The size of a packet with a HELLO message advertising n neighbor
nodes is: 1514 + (40 + 32 + 513)n = 1514 + 585n bits when using 512-bit IBC, and
1002 + (40 + 32 + 257)n = 1002 + 329n bits when using 256-bit IBC. The size of a
packet with a TC message advertising n neighbor nodes is: 1410 + (32 + 32 + 513)n =
1410+577n bits when using 512-bit IBC, and 898+(32+32+257)n = 898+321n bits
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when using 256-bit IBC. Figure 6.2(a) and Figure 6.2(b) show the overhead per neighbor
in a standard HELLO/TC message and IBC encrypted and signed HELLO/TC message
with neighbor’s attestation, in a network with 1 to 100 potential neighbors per node. Fig-
ure 6.2(c) and Figure 6.2(d) show the ratio of overhead of IBC encrypted and signed
HELLO/TC messages with neighbor’s attestation to standard overhead, in a network with
1 to 100 potential neighbors per node.
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Figure 6.2: Transmission Overhead of a OLSR Packet with a HELLO or TC Message with
Neigbor’s Attestation
From these figures, we can see that per neighbor overhead remains almost constant
when number of neighbors increases. This is because neighbor’s attestation is per-neighbor
information, when number of neighbors increases, attestation data increases proportion-
ally.
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6.2.3 An Optimization to Transmission Overhead
In situations where communication capacity is limited, one can choose to trade off be-
tween transmission overhead and computational overhead. As was noted in [13], some
elliptic curves produce n-bit signatures and the discrete log problem on these curves is
reducible to a discrete log problem in a finite field of size approximately 26n. Using this
type of curves, for n-bit security we get signatures of size n/6 bits. This can dramatically
reduce size of signatures.
The size of an OLSR packet with a HELLO message advertising n neighbor nodes is:
d513/6e × 2 + 488 + 40n = 660 + 40n bits when using 512-bit IBC, and d257/6e × 2 +
488 + 40n = 574 + 40n bits when using 256-bit IBC. The size of a packet with a TC
message advertising n neighbor nodes is: d513/6e × 2 + 384 + 32n = 556 + 32n bits
when using 512-bit IBC, and d257/6e×2+384+32n = 470+32n bits when using 256-
bit IBC. Figure 6.3(a) and Figure 6.3(b) show the overhead per neighbor in a standard
HELLO/TC message and a HELLO/TC message with compressed IBC signatures, in a
network with 1 to 40 potential neighbors per node. Figure 6.3(c) and Figure 6.3(d) show
the ratio of overhead of a compressed IBC encrypted and signed HELLO/TC message to
standard overhead, in a network with 1 to 100 potential neighbors per node.
The size of a packet with a HELLO message advertising n neighbor nodes with neigh-
bor’s attestation is: d513/6e × 2 + 488+ (40+ 32+ d513/6e)n = 660 + 158n bits when
using 512-bit IBC, and d257/6e×2+488+(40+32+d257/6e)n= 574+115n bits when
using 256-bit IBC. The size of a packet with a TC message advertising n neighbor nodes
with neighbor’s attestation is: d513/6e×2+384+(32+32+d513/6e×2)n = 556+150n
bits when using 512-bit IBC, and d257/6e×2+384+(32+32+d257/6e)n= 427+107n
bits when using 256-bit IBC.
Figure 6.4(a) and Figure 6.4(b) show the overhead per neighbor in a standard HELLO/TC
message and HELLO/TC message with neighbor’s attestation and compressed IBC sig-
natures, in a network with 1 to 100 potential neighbors per node. Figure 6.4(c) and
Figure 6.4(d) show the ratio of overhead of a compressed IBC encrypted and signed
HELLO/TC message with neighbor’s attestation to standard overhead, in a network with
1 to 100 potential neighbors per node.
From these figures, we can see that the overhead is significantly reduced by com-
pressed IBC signature compared to original one. We also see that neighbor’s attestation
brings too much overhead. If this feature is needed, we strongly suggest using compressed
IBC signature.
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Figure 6.3: Transmission Overhead of a OLSR Packet with a HELLO or TC Message with
Neigbor’s Attestation and Compressed IBC Signatures
6.3 Simulation Setup
We have implemented the KM-SR framework in NS-2, a popular network simulator for
MANETs, using cryptographic primitives from MIRACL library version 5.5. The bilinear
map eˆwe use is the Tate pairing. The elliptic curve E we use is Type A supersingular curve
y2 = x3 + x defined over the finite field Fp (p is a prime and p ≡ 3 mod 4). We use a
160-bit Solinas prime 2159 + 217 + 1 as q, and use a 256-bit p and a 512-bit p to compare
performance. We simulate an ad hoc network with 10 to 40 nodes uniformly deployed in
a 700×500m2 square field. The physical-layer path loss model is the two-ray model. The
radio propagation range for each node is 250 meters and the channel capacity is 2 Mb/s.
The base MAC protocol used is the DCF of IEEE 802.11. Node mobility uses the random
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Figure 6.4: Transmission Overhead of a OLSR Packet with a HELLO or TC Message with
Neigbor’s Attestation and Compressed IBC Signatures
waypoint model with maximum pause time 10 seconds and maximum speed 1 m/s. CBR
sessions are used to generate network data traffic at rate of 20 kb/s and packet size of 512
bytes. We execute the simulation on a computer with Intel Core-2 Duo 2.8GHz CPU and
running RedHat Linux AS4.
6.4 Simulation Results and Analysis
We start the simulation with the environment and parameters mentioned above. We run
simulations in 9 rounds which are the permutation of network size 10/20/40 and crypto-
graphic settings no-cryptographic-operation/256-bit IBC/512-bit IBC. Each round is ex-
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ecuted for 10 simulated minutes and each data point represents an average of ten runs
with identical traffic models. After simulations are executed, we analyze results from
simulation logs and draw the figures below.
Figure 6.5 shows end-to-end delays of routing messages, measured by the difference
between sending time and receiving time, in network size 10/20/40 and cryptographic
settings no-cryptographic-operation/256-bit IBC/512-bit IBC.
Figure 6.6 shows delays added by IBC cryptographic operations, i.e. delays with the
256-bit and 512-bit IBC minus delays with standard OLSR routing messages in same sim-
ulation setup. We compare the delays added by 256-bit IBC and 512-bit IBC in 10/20/40-
node networks.
From these figures, we observe that:
• There is a noticeable jitter in routing message delays, and this jitter increases when
number of nodes increases. The reason of this is that when number of nodes in-
creases, the number of routing messages a node receives also increases and the
number of hops a routing message travels through may also increase, and the travel-
ling time taken by a routing message from a 1-hop neighbor and the one by a routing
message from a multi-hop node differ a lot. Because of the encryption/decryption
and signature/verification operations on every hop, the secure routing scheme am-
plifies this difference.
• The proposed KM-SR framework does not cause any substantial degradation in the
network performance. Communication and computational overhead is stable in all
scenarios. For example, in the 40 node setting, the average delay of routing mes-
sages without cryptographic operation is about 0.002 second; the average delay of
routing message with 256-bit IBC is about 0.004 second, and the average delay of
routing messages with 512-bit IBC is about 0.006 second. Compared to the simu-
lation results measured in many other schemes (mostly 0.01 second to 0.1 second)
for example [94] and [28], the delay added by secure routing in our framework is
acceptable.
As a sidenote, we would like to show to interested readers the comparison between
elliptic curve cryptographic operations and RSA: Generally, an elliptic curve whose order
is a 160-bit prime offers approximately the same level of security as RSA with 1024-
bit [71]. And the performance comparison is shown in Table- 6.3 [86].
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(a) Delays in a 10-node network
(b) Delays in a 20-node network
(c) Delays in a 40-node network
Figure 6.5: Comparison of End-to-end Delays of Routing Messages
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(a) Delays added by 256-bit IBC operations
(b) Delays added by 512-bit IBC operations
Figure 6.6: Delays Added by IBC Operations
Systems Key Genera-
tion
Signature Verification
ECDSA on
Fp192
5.5 6.3 26
DSA-1024 22.7 23.6 28.3
RSA-1024 1000 43.3 0.65
Table 6.3: Comparison of Performance of Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Operations, DSA
and RSA (in milliseconds) [86]
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6.5 Scalability Analysis
When the network size is increasing, there is more and more traffic to be transmitted and
processed on each node, and thus performance will definitely decrease. This is concerned
as scalability of a scheme. In the simulation of our KM-SR framework, we have simulated
network size up to 40. It is infeasible to simulate a large-size network, and actually
unnecessary if we can estimate and evaluate the impact of network size to the performance
of the framework.
As our KM-SR framework is based on OLSR routing protocol, the computational and
communication overhead brought by HELLO messages is proportional to the number of
neighbors of a node, and not the number of nodes in the network. Only the computational
and communication overhead brought by TC messages is proportional to number of nodes
in the network. As is specified in OLSR protocol [23], TC message interval is 2.5 times
of HELLO message interval. The number of neighbors of a node has a ceiling value (let’s
say nbmax), and does not change after the ceiling value is reached. The overall overhead
changes much slower once nbmax is reached.
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Figure 6.7: Traffic Model of the KM-SR Integrated Framework
We take the traffic amount to be received and processed by a MPR node to calculate
computational and communication overhead of a node and to evaluate scalability of the
scheme. This is the worst case because a MPR node forwards each HELLO message
and TC message and has more traffic than normal nodes. When network size is less than
nbmax, traffic to be received and processed by a MPR node is caused by both HELLO
CHAPTER 6. SIMULATION RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 83
messages and TC messages. Again we consider the worst case—assume all nodes to
be neighbors. According to transmission overhead evaluation in Section 6.2, in a TC
message interval, the traffic amount to be received and processed by a MPR node is about
(1514 + 40× n)× n × 2.5 + (1410 + 32× n) × n = 5195× n + 132× n2 for 512-bit
IBC, (1002 + 40× n)× n× 2.5 + (898 + 32× n)× n = 3403×+132× n2 for 256-bit
IBC, and (488 + 40 × n) × n × 2.5 + (384 + 32 × n) × n = 3050 × n + 132 × n2 for
standard OLSR without any cryptographic operation.
When network size is above nbmax, traffic to be received and processed by a MPR node
comprises that from neighbor nodes (as calculated above) and that from non-neighbor
nodes. Traffic from non-neighbor nodes is caused by only TC messages. The increased
traffic amount from each non-neighbor node is 1410+32×nbmax for OLSR with 512-bit
IBC, 898 + 32× nbmax for OLSR with 256-bit IBC, and 384 + 32× nbmax for standard
OLSR. The number of non-neighbor nodes is n− nbmax. The overall traffic amount to be
received and processed by a MPR node in a TC interval is therefore C1 + (1410 + 32 ×
nbmax)×(n−nbmax) for OLSR with 512-bit IBC, C2+(898+32×nbmax)×(n−nbmax)
for OLSR with 256-bit IBC, and C3 + (384 + 32 × nbmax) × (n − nbmax) for standard
OLSR, where C1, C2 and C3 are constants denoting the traffic amounts at nbmax point for
each case correspondingly.
Figure 6.7 shows the estimated traffic of a MPR node in a TC interval of the frame-
work for network size 0 to 200, with nbmax set to 40. We collate this model with the
previous simulation results and find that they match with each other. This model gives a
rough picture of the scalability of the framework. From this model, the network designer
can decide how many nodes are supported depending on bandwidth and processing power
of nodes.
As a sidenote, we need to mention that all above calculation and estimation are based
on IPv4 packets. When applied to IPv6, the length of a packet header and the length of a
message header are increased by a constant, and message length is increased in proportion
to number of neighbors advertised in the message. The transmission overhead model and
traffic amount model do not change much. A curve just moves up a little as a whole.
6.6 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter analyzed performance of the proposed framework, demonstrated simulation
results, and evaluated its scalability. In the next chapter we will present how to integrate
solutions to limitations and weaknesses of IBC itself.
Chapter 7
Addressing Limitations and Weaknesses
of IBC
So far, we have presented a novel IBC framework that addresses main issues of apply-
ing IBC to MANETs. IBC itself has some limitations and weaknesses. In this chapter,
we propose solutions to these limitations and weaknesses. The reason we present these
solutions in a separate chapter, instead of part of the framework, is mainly that although
we start from the perspective of the KM-SR integrated framework, we aim to achieve
solutions generic to all IBC schemes.
7.1 Addressing Identity Disclosure
We realize that the major vulnerability of MANETs, in contrast to wired networks, is lack
of perimeter security due to dynamic topology and membership and wireless communi-
cation characteristics. In context of anonymous communication, the lack of perimeter
security leads to the difficulty of specifying the anonymity set. For ad hoc networks that
make use of use of an offline authority [65], we suggest using shared system secret to
provide perimeter security which separate authentic nodes from adversary nodes, so that
the anonymity set can be differentiated and protected. We propose some general-purpose
identity (i.e. sender and receiver IP addresses in MANETs) hiding techniques that can
be used in any routing protocol and also in any higher layer application in ad hoc net-
works. With an identity-protection key shared among authentic nodes, all real identities
are hidden from adversaries. Network designers can apply these techniques in their rout-
ing protocols and applications with little modification and extension work.
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If identities are simply encrypted using existing cryptosystems, the real identities are
hidden to outsiders. However, adversaries can still apply traffic analysis and statistics
to encrypted identities, and infer some information regarding the real identities. For ex-
ample, an encrypted identity with a higher traffic in battlefield is more likely to be a
commander than other nodes.
A working identity hiding scheme for MANETs should have the following properties:
1. Identities in packets in the air should look totally random.
2. Encryption and decryption should be computable for authentic nodes: the sender,
receiver, and nodes en route, but not computable for outsiders/eavesdroppers.
3. Packet format should not change, or the change should be compatible with existing
routing protocols. In other words, it is better to have no extra field and no extra
message added to a packet.
We adopt a commonly used assumption that the adversary in the network cannot attack
below the network layer such as MAC (Medium Access Control) layer attack [56]. We
consider this to be a basic feature of the wireless communication techniques used, for
example, the IEEE 802.11 series. Many cryptosystems can be used to satisfy requirement
2, without breaking requirement 3 – just take the address as a binary input, and encrypt
and decrypt it. But satisfying requirement 1 is not trivial, because regular encryption
systems do not generate random output for the same input (the actual identity). Random
output requires adding random portion to the fixed input.
The basic idea of our schemes is to encrypt the source and destination IP addresses
with a random number using some popular cryptosystem, and transmit the random num-
bers in the IP header option field if there is no other space form them. We name the random
number used “Identity Hiding Parameter”. In IPv4, the “Identity Hiding Parameter” can
be placed in “options” field of the header. In IPv6, the “Identity Hiding Parameter” can be
placed in “Hop-by-Hop Options header” of extension headers (value of the Next Header
is ‘0’ in IPv6 header). Figure 7.1 illustrate the modified header and extension header in
IPv4 and IPv6 packets.
7.1.1 AES-based Scheme
Standard AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits,
and for specific input and key, the output is always the same. Consider applying the cryp-
tosystem to IP addresses in MANETs, the input is fixed, and the key should also be fixed
CHAPTER 7. ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS AND WEAKNESSES OF IBC 86
(a) Identity Hiding in IPv4 Packets (b) Identity Hiding in IPv6 Packets
Figure 7.1: Identity Hiding in IPv4 and IPv6 Packets
and pre-distributed; but we want the output to be random. Thus, we need some revision
or reorganization to AES cryptosystem.
A Scheme for IPv4 Addresses:
We distribute a 128-bit key k to all authentic nodes when dispatching. An IPv4 address
m is 32 bits long. We generate a 96-bit random number r for each packet. We append
the random number to the IP address and encrypt it with a 128-bit AES cryptosystem:
c = AESE(m + r, k). The first 32 bits of resulted 128-bit output are placed in the IP
address, and the rest in the option field. An authentic node decrypts the original 128-bit
plaintext as m+ r = AESD(c, k), and gets the 32-bit address (r is of no use now).
For example, we choose the key k = a3b2c3d6f2c6e8561278164546cd3515. Assume
the IPv4 address to be encrypted is m = 126.140.216.213 (7e8cd8d5 in hex). In one
packet, choose a random number as r = 11000000a1c3b8d54e34156f . Then,
c = AESE(m+ r, k)
= AESE(7e8cd8d511000000a1c3b8d54e34156f,
a3b2c3d6f2c6e8561278164546cd3515)
= b7fcc8cdbdac86d7d8947729fbc6e919.
The first 4 bytesB7FCC8CD (i.e. 183.252.200.205) is placed in the IP address field, and
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place BDAC86D7D8947729FBC6E919 in the option field of the header. To decrypt,
m+ r = AESD(c, k)
= AESD(b7fcc8cdbdac86d7d8947729fbc6e919,
a3b2c3d6f2c6e8561278164546cd3515)
= 7e8cd8d511000000a1c3b8d54e34156f.
The first 32 bits are the original IP address.
In another packet, choose a random number as r = 11000000a1c3b8d54e34156e.
Then,
c = AESE(m+ r, k)
= AESE(7e8cd8d511000000a1c3b8d54e34156e,
a3b2c3d6f2c6e8561278164546cd3515)
= 2f8748eb04b57c2fd89cdcf39075572c.
The first 4 bytes 2f8748eb (i.e. 47.135.72.235) is placed in the IP address field, and place
04B57C2FD89CDCF39075572C in the option field of the header. Note that although
the random numbers selected are only 1 bit different, the resulted encrypted addresses are
different on every bit. To decrypt,
m+ r = AESD(c, k)
= AESD(2f8748eb04b57c2fd89cdcf39075572c,
a3b2c3d6f2c6e8561278164546cd3515)
= 7e8cd8d511000000a1c3b8d54e34156f.
The first 32 bits are the original IP address.
A Scheme for IPv6 Addresses:
We distribute a 128-bit key k to all authentic nodes when dispatching. An IPv6 address
m is 128 bits long. We encrypt it for a packet in the following steps:
1. Generate a 128-bit random number r, and place it in the option field of extension
header.
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2. Using AES as blackbox, encrypt k1 = AESE(r, k);
3. Using k1 as key and AES as blackbox, calculate encrypted address c = AESE(m, k1),
and place c in the address field.
Accordingly, we decrypt an encrypted address in the following steps:
1. Take the 128-bit random number r from the option field of extension header.
2. Using AES as blackbox, encrypt k1 = AESE(r, k);
3. Using k1 as key and AES as blackbox, calculate decrypted addressm = AESD(c, k1).
For example, we use the same key as in Section 7.1.1. Assume the IPv6 address to be
encrypted is 5F1B:DF00:CE3E:E200:0020:0800:2078:E3E3. In one packet, choose a
random number as r =a115862311000000a1c3b8d54e34156f . Then,
k1 = AESE(r, k) = 18d1995807fd0ea5fc47717ef907a1c3,
c = AESE(m, k1)
= AESE(5f1bdf00ce3ee200002008002078e3e3,
18d1995807fd0ea5fc47717ef907a1c3)
= d7ae18429f9bb5e60914f5f092bafb45.
D7AE:1842:9F9B:B5E6:0914:F5F0:92BA:FB45 is placed in the IP address field. To
decrypt, a node calculates k1 in same way as above.
m = AESD(c, k1)
= AESD(d7ae18429f9bb5e60914f5f092bafb45,
18d1995807fd0ea5fc47717ef907a1c3)
= 5f1bdf00ce3ee200002008002078e3e3.
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In another packet, we choose a different random number as r =
a115862311000000a1c3b8d54e34156e. Then,
k1 = AESE(r, k) = 3512de51fd9903c26f03c86e2dfa507b,
c = AESE(m, k1)
= AESE(5f1bdf00ce3ee200002008002078e3e3,
3512de51fd9903c26f03c86e2dfa507b)
= 8cd1b2cd2a33b98bd9d4d78bc89e7c71.
8CD1:B2CD:2A33:B98B:D9D4:D78B:C89E:7C71 is placed in the IP address field.
To decrypt,
m = AESD(c, k1)
= AESD(8cd1b2cd2a33b98bd9d4d78bc89e7c71,
3512de51fd9903c26f03c86e2dfa507b)
= 5f1bdf00ce3ee200002008002078e3e3.
7.1.2 RSA-based Scheme
Algorithm:
The standard RSA algorithm produces fixed output for a fixed input, so we modify it as
follows:
1. The system administrator chooses secret primes p and q and computes n = pq,
φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). n and φ(n) are distributed to authentic nodes before dis-
patching.
2. For each packet, node A chooses a random e with gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, and encrypts
IP address m in the packet as c ≡ me (mod n). c and e are sent in the packet.
3. An authentic node computes d ≡ e−1 (mod φ(n)), upon receiving the packet, and
decrypts c by m ≡ cd (mod n).
The security foundation of the algorithm is the same as the RSA, namely the Integer
Factorization problem: the modulus n and encryption key e are made public; only those
who know the factorization of n can calculate φ(n) and the decryption key d. In a network
system, the factorization of n is a system wide secret (in case n is not large enough, even
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n is secret), but e changes for each packet, thus only authentic nodes can calculate d and
get the real identities.
Applying to IPv4 Packets:
An IPv4 address is 32-bit long, thus the transformed address is also 32-bit. For simplicity,
we show the case in which the modulus n is a 32-bit integer. Accordingly, the largest
length of e is also 32 bits, or 4 bytes. In the IPv4 header options, one byte of “type” and
one byte of “length” are required, and 2 bytes padding is required for alignment, so the
total length of the option is 8 bytes.
For example, let p = 65479 (a prime number), q = 64591 (a prime number), then
n = p · q = 65479 · 64591 = 4229354089, φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1) = 65478 · 64590 =
4229224020. Assume the IPv4 address to be encrypted is 224.0.0.0 (m = 3758096384 in
decimal). In one IP packet, we choose the encryption key e randomly as e = 9007. The
encrypted address is c ≡ me mod n ≡ 37580963849007 ≡ 188128951 (mod 4229354089),
i.e. 11.54.158.183. The encrypted address is placed in the IP address field of the packet.
φ(n) is shared secret among authentic nodes, e is transmitted in the header option of the
IP packet; so an authentic node can calculate the decryption key d ≡ e−1 mod φ(n) ≡
9007−1 ≡ 1317553303 (mod 4229224020), and then decrypt the IP address as m ≡ cd
mod n ≡ 1881289511317553303 ≡ 3758096384 (mod 4229354089).
In another packet, e is chosen another number. Assume e = 9011, then the encrypted
address is c ≡ me mod n ≡ 37580963849011 ≡ 2953896956 (mod 4229354089), i.e.
176.16.227.252. An authentic node can calculate the decryption key d ≡ e−1 mod φ(n) =
9011−1 ≡ 829324031 (mod 4229224020), and then decrypt the IP address as m ≡ cd mod
n ≡ 2953896956829324031 ≡ 3758096384 (mod 4229354089).
Applying to IPv6 Packets:
An IPv6 address is 128 bits long, thus the transformed address is also 128-bit. For simplic-
ity, we show the case in which the modulus n is a 128-bit integer. Accordingly, the largest
length of e is also 128 bits, or 16 bytes. We place e in the Hop-by-hop option header
immediately after IPv6 header (Next header = 0 in IPv6 header). One byte of “type” and
one byte of “length” are required, and 6 bytes padding is required for alignment, so the
total length of the option is 24 bytes.
For example, let p = 18446744073709551557 (a prime number), q = 18446744073709
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551533 (a prime number), then
n = p · q = 340282366920938460843936948965011886881(less than 2128),
φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1) = 18446744073709551556 · 18446744073709551532
= 340282366920938460807043460817592783792.
Assume the IPv6 address to be encrypted is 5F1B:DF00:CE3E:E200:0020:0800:2078:
E3E3 (m = 126421374655918995273183870066405991395 in decimal). In one IP
packet, we choose the encryption key e randomly as e = 9007. The encrypted address is
c ≡ memod n ≡ 1264213746559189952731838700664059913959007
≡ 259104061544288900162192625529409559801
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881),
i.e. C2ED:A088:948E:4635:0589:880B:F6E8:DCF9. The encrypted address is placed
in the IP address field of the packet. φ(n) is shared secret among authentic nodes, e is
transmitted in the extension header of the IP packet. An authentic node can calculate the
decryption key
d ≡ e−1mod φ(n) ≡ 9007−1
≡ 106010027931625771180699894643517858479
(mod 340282366920938460807043460817592783792),
and then decrypt the IP address as
m ≡ cdmod n
≡ 259104061544288900162192625529409559801ˆ
106010027931625771180699894643517858479
≡ 126421374655918995273183870066405991395
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881).
In another packet, e is chosen another random number. Assume e = 9011, then the
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encrypted address is
c ≡ memod n ≡ 1264213746559189952731838700664059913959011
≡ 218386055390514149206611613922146001358
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881),
i.e. A44B:9FD5:7CF4:ECE5:339C:B448:E0CA:21CE. An authentic node can cal-
culate the decryption key
d ≡ e−1mod φ(n) ≡ 9011−1
≡ 26320808982787049959217544355772075275
(mod 340282366920938460807043460817592783792),
and then decrypt the IP address as
m ≡ cdmod n
≡ 218386055390514149206611613922146001358ˆ
26320808982787049959217544355772075275
≡ 126421374655918995273183870066405991395
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881).
7.1.3 ElGamal-based Scheme
Algorithm:
In ElGamal algorithm, there is a random number used for each message, and it is an
essential requirement that the random number used each time be different. This means
the ElGamal is already very close to the requirements of an identity hiding scheme. The
following algorithm is very similar to standard ElGamal algorithm, the only difference
being in the key distribution:
1. The system administrator chooses a large primes n, a primitive root g, and a ran-
dom integer k (less than n). n, g and k are distributed to authentic nodes before
dispatching.
2. For each packet, node A chooses a random integer r, and encrypts IP address m in
the packet as c ≡ m · gkr (mod n). c and gr are sent in the packet.
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3. An authentic node, upon receiving the packet, decrypts c by m ≡ c/grk (mod n).
Applying to IPv4 Packets:
Again, for simplicity, we show the case in which the modulus n is a 32-bit integer. Ac-
cordingly, the largest length of k is also 32 bits, or 4 bytes. The total length of the option in
the IP header is 8 bytes, taking consideration of one byte of “type”, one byte of “length”,
and 2 bytes of padding.
For example, let n = 4294967291 (a prime number less than 232), and g = 2 (a
primitive root of n). Choose the key as k = 59. Assume the IPv4 address to be encrypted
is 126.140.216.213 (m = 2123159765 in decimal). In one IP packet, we choose the
random number r randomly as r = 1798435485 (less than n). The encrypted address is
c ≡ m · gk
r
mod n ≡ 2123159765 · 2591798435485 ≡ 4201974492 (mod 4294967291), i.e.
250.117.10.220. The encrypted address is placed in the IP address field of the packet. n, g
and k are shared secrets among authentic nodes, gr is transmitted in the header option
of the IP packet. So an authentic node can decrypt the IP address as m ≡ c/grk mod
n ≡ 4201974492/21798435485
59
≡ 2123159765 (mod 4294967291).
In another packet, we choose the random number r as r = 7586249853 (less than n).
The encrypted address is c ≡ m · gkr mod n ≡ 2123159765 · 2597586249853 ≡ 1275954819
(mod 4294967291), i.e. 76.13.134.131. The encrypted address is placed in the IP address
field of the packet. An authentic node can decrypt the IP address as m ≡ c/grk mod
n ≡ 1275954819/27586249853
59
≡ 2123159765 ( mod 4294967291).
Applying to IPv6 Packets:
Again, for simplicity, we show the case in which the modulus n is a 128-bit integer.
Accordingly, the largest length of k is also 128 bits, or 16 bytes. We place k in the Hop-
by-hop option header immediately after IPv6 header (Next header = 0 in IPv6 header).
The total length of the option is 24 bytes, considering one byte of “type”, one byte of
“length”, and 6 bytes padding is required for alignment.
For example, let n = 340282366920938463463374607431768211297 (a prime num-
ber less than 2128), and g = 5 (a primitive root of n). Choose the key as k = 59 (less than
n). Assume the IPv6 address to be encrypted is 5F1B:DF00:CE3E:E200:0020:0800:2078:
E3E3 (m = 126421374655918995273183870066405991395 in decimal). In one IP
packet, we choose the random number r randomly as r = 1798435485 (less than n).
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The encrypted address is
c ≡ m · gk
r
mod n
≡ 126421374655918995273183870066405991395·
559
1798435485
≡ 11327223807265498558802956817597549780
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881),
i.e. 0885:8B40:6B7B:1D07:13B3:B3F9:5B19:4CD4. The encrypted address is placed
in the IP address field of the packet. n, g and k are shared secrets among authentic nodes,
gr is transmitted in the header option of the IP packet. An authentic node can decrypt the
IP address as
m ≡ c/grkmod n
≡ 11327223807265498558802956817597549780/
51798435485
59
≡ 126421374655918995273183870066405991395
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881)
In another packet, we choose the random number r randomly as r = 126346546799798.
The encrypted address is
c ≡ m · gk
r
mod n
≡ 126421374655918995273183870066405991395·
559
126346546799798
≡ 119086206211554693843012791568616584700
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881),
i.e. 5997:2B46:E6F1:FB19:4FAE:A0D6:26EE:F5FC. The encrypted address is
placed in the IP address field of the packet. An authentic node can decrypt the IP ad-
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dress as
m ≡ c/grkmod n
≡ 119086206211554693843012791568616584700/
5126346546799798
59
≡ 126421374655918995273183870066405991395
(mod 340282366920938460843936948965011886881)
7.1.4 Comparison of the Schemes
The above RSA-based and ElGamal-based schemes require a modulus number. Because
there are some requirements for choosing this modulus number specified by the algo-
rithms, it cannot be exactly equal to the maximum IP address. If this modulus number
is greater than the maximum IP address, the length of the resulted address may also be
longer than standard length, and there will be definitely extra field for extra bits. If this
modulus number is less than the maximum IP address, it cannot cover all IP addresses.
Fortunately, large addresses are reserved for future use in IP standards, and are not really
used currently. If for any reason these addresses are to be used, we can extend the address
field by 1 extra byte—using 40-bit modulus for IPv4 and 136-bit for IPv6 addresses—and
accommodate the transformed address in the “enlarged” address field—putting the extra
byte to the “Identity Hiding Parameter” field. In contrast, the AES-based scheme does not
have this limitation, because the last step is not modulus operation, and thus all values
representable by the address field can be encrypted.
Another concern for compatibility is the option field or extension header that requires
implementation on all hosts and routers in a network. We notice that for RSA-based and
ElGamal-based scheme, it is not trivial to avoid the option field or extension header,
because in both of them, a random number is needed to accompany a packet to decrypt
the hidden address. In RSA-based scheme, the security level is dependent on the length of
the random number. If the random number e in the packet is small, it is subject to crypto-
analysis. In ElGamal-based scheme, the random number gr in the packet is always of
length defined by modulus n.
For AES-based scheme, security level is not dependent on the length of the random
number; so we can integrate a short random number (we name it “scrambler”) into the
address field. This is applicable because a MANET is not directly connected to Internet,
so we really do not need a 32-bit address field. In most cases, a 16-bit or 24-bit address
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is big enough for a MANET. For example a 16-bit IP address can accommodate 65,536
hosts; so we have space for a 16-bit scrambler. In this way, the IP address itself contains
a random number, but the randomness only happens on fixed bits and we need to diffuse
it to the whole field. If we pass the transformed IP address to an AES cryptosystem, the
output is a random number on every bit. For a 128-bit IPv6 address, we can pass it to a
standard 128-bit AES block cipher. For a 32-bit IPv4 address, we can use AES in MR_CFB
(Cipher Feed-Back) mode as a stream cipher to diffuse the scrambler bits.
Figure 7.2 shows the simulation result of processing IPv4 addresses with AES using 8-
bit scrambler in 250 packets. An original IP address 192.168.0.1 is scrambled randomly
to different addresses in the range [0.0.0.0, 255.255.255.255].
Figure 7.2: Scrambled IP Addresses
Compared to previous proposals in literature, our scheme has the following advan-
tages: while previous proposals seem to focus on certain routing protocols, our scheme
can be applied not only in any routing protocol, but also in any protocol or application
on higher layers; while previous proposals use either pairwise keys or a large number
of pseudonyms, our scheme only relies on a small number of pre-distributed parameters.
The idea of this scheme is based on our notion of achieving all-around perimeter secu-
rity of MANETs by pre-distributed system wide secrets, and is applicable to MANETs
with offline authority, such as communication systems for public safety, emergency and
disaster applications.
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7.2 Addressing Key Revocation Difficulty
Combined with the previous identity-hiding scheme, we propose a key revocation scheme.
To facilitate identity revocation, we divide IP addresses into two categories: Long-term
addresses that do not expire and are implicitly valid until explicit revocation, and Short-
term addresses that expire after a while until explicit renewal. The first type of address
ends with bit 0; the second type ends with 1. A long-term address has 16 bits scrambler.
A short-term address has 8 bits scrambler and 8 bits validity counter. (This is a general
scheme. The length can be adjusted as will be discussed shortly).
Validity counter can be used in several ways, for example:
• Indicating the count of packets sent from this address: Validity counter of an ad-
dress decrements each time when a packet is sent from the address. Correspond-
ingly, each node en route maintains in the routing table the value of validity counter
for each short-term address, and checks this value in each packet. If this value is
not decremented or reaches 0, the packet is discarded. Note that in a packet, the
encrypted address is used, and is decrypted upon reception.
• Indicating time span of validity of this address: Validity counter indicates number
of days, or number of hours, etc. the address is valid after first use. Other nodes
calculate the expiry time when they first receive a packet from this address, store the
expiry time for each node, and check against the expiry time each time they receive
a packet from this address. If the expiry time is reached, no packet is accepted any
more.
When a short-term identity expires, the administrator has the right to renew its validity
by broadcasting an Identity Renewal Message. The Identity Renewal Message contains the
addresses to be renewed, the new validity counter of each address, the timestamp, and is
finally signed by the administrator (Sign and verification processes are similar as those for
entrance ticket explained earlier in Section 5.2). The network nodes update their validity
counter table according to the Identity Renewal Message.
When a node with short-term or long-term identity is compromised or dismissed, or a
node with short-term has finished its task ahead of schedule, the administrator can revoke
its identity at any time needed by broadcasting an Identity Revocation Message. The
Identity Revocation Message contains the addresses to be revoked, the timestamp, and is
signed by the administrator. Each network node maintains a revocation list according to
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the Identity Revocation Message. The node checks the identity of each packet it receives
against the revocation list and discards the packet with an identity in the list.
Although the Identity Renewal Message and Identity Revocation Message mechanism
is no better than existing schemes, the use of Validity counter minimizes the need of iden-
tity renewal and identity revocation, which provides a higher reliability and saves much
traffic overhead. Since all identities are encrypted, this decreases the possibility of an
identity being stolen or impersonated by adversaries. For short-term identities, the length
of validity counter field can be adjusted according to specific task so that the validity
expiration keeps step with task progress. With the limitation of validity counter, the ben-
efit an adversary stealing an identity is limited. Thus the significance of revocation is
also decreased—even the identity is stolen by adversaries, there is very limited room they
can do with it. For example, in a network with 1000 nodes, we assume 200 of them are
short-term nodes and 800 are long-term nodes, among long-term nodes 10% are detected
compromised later, and there is no synchronization mechanism. With previous schemes,
280 revocation messages need to be sent. With our scheme, if the validity counter is set
to proper length, the number of revocation messages is only 80.
7.3 Addressing Key Escrow
The scheme we proposed for prevention of mobile attacks in Section 5.2 also addresses
the key escrow issue. With the KM-SR integrated framework, after initialization phase,
the nodes can generate pairwise secret key that is key-escrow free, and contribute to a dy-
namic part of master key. The new master key is comprised of a dynamic part and a static
part, and thus is unknown both to the offline administrator and to online nodes, since the
offline administrator does not know the dynamic part which is kept secret by a threshold
number of online nodes, and the static part is kept secret to online nodes. The new private
key of a node is known only to the node. The new system public key is only known to
the online nodes. The administrator does not have the master key without cooperation of
other nodes. Thus, the online nodes can communicate with each other confidential to the
offline administrator, but online nodes can still communicate with offline administrator
using the initial static keys.
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7.4 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presented our solutions to address limitations and weaknesses of IBC itself,
namely the identity disclosure problem, key revocation difficulty problem, and key escrow
problem. These solutions can be used in other IBC schemes, as well as the proposed KM-
SR integrated framework.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
Security of MANETs is still a challenging problem due to specific features of MANETs
discussed in Section 2.2. This thesis reviews requirements and solutions of this problem.
Traditional cryptographic solutions use either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography.
Both of them have many limitations when used in MANETs. Identity-based Cryptog-
raphy, as a new asymmetric cryptography technology, has many advantages when con-
sidered in the context of a MANET, and is the most promising technology for MANET
security (Section 2.3). Concentrated on IBC solutions, this research studies existing
applications of IBC in MANETs, and points out issues of applying this technology to
MANET security (Chapter 3). The biggest issue preventing these solutions from being
used in practical applications is the interdependency cycle between secure routing and se-
curity services, for instance key management. Other issues include using IBC in the same
way as traditional CBC and disabling advantages of IBC, insecurity of key generation
process, vulnerability to Sybil attacks, mobile attacks, proximity-caused insecurity etc.
In light of such issues, a novel KM-SR integrated framework for MANET security is
proposed in this thesis (Chapter 4). The proposed framework addresses key management
and secure routing interdependency cycle problems of IBC. This framework brings these
contributions: compared to symmetric key solutions, it has more functionality derived
from asymmetric keys, and is more secure due to using 1-to-m broadcasting key instead of
only 1 group broadcasting key, and has less keys to store per node due to using asymmetric
keys instead of pairwise symmetric keys; compared to CBC solutions, the storage and
communication requirements are lower due to IBC properties; compared to previous IBC
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solutions, it has no KM-SR interdependency cycle problem, and is immune to insider
attacks and mobile attacks and many other routing attacks.
We implemented the framework and simulated it in NS-2. Simulation results show
that performance of the framework is comparable to, or better than, existing schemes
(Chapter 6).
We prove the security of the encryption/signature scheme used in the framework in
the random oracle model (Chapter 5). Based on the security of the scheme, these se-
curity features of the framework are ensured: confidentiality, integrity, authentication,
freshness, and non-repudiation. These security features lend the framework capability to
defend against most known attacks on network layers, such as spoofing and Sybil attacks,
eavesdropping and traffic analysis, modifying routing packets, etc. With some extra en-
hancements, the framework can counter some other attacks, such as record and replay
attacks, wormhole attacks, blackhole attacks, and mobile attacks.
IBC itself has some limitations and weaknesses, such as key escrow, key revocation
difficulty, and identity disclosure. We propose solutions to address these limitations and
weaknesses in this framework (Chapter 7).
The result of this work presents a feasible security solution to a wide range of MANETs
where there is an administrator that generates and distributes initial system parameters to
all nodes, and the administrator can authenticate the identity of a node and assign initial
private key to it. Basically this includes all MANETs where IBC is applicable, with an
extra requirement—a controlled deployment phase. Examples of this type of MANETs
include but are not limited to: sensor networks, wearable computer systems in military,
public safety networks, and emergency and disaster rescue teams.
8.2 Limitations and Future Work
The framework provides a security solution for MANETs mainly on network layer, on the
assumption that link/physical layer security are already provided. If that is not the case,
the framework may fail to work. Security on transport layer and application layer is not
considered in this framework. This means that while secure routing assures secure appli-
cations to run in the network, malicious applications can also enjoy this service without
any penalty. Security on application layer needs to be considered on a per-application
basis, and network layer security does not provide any help on this.
We notice that the framework is not immune to denial-of-service attacks and selfish-
ness of inside nodes. These availability related issues cannot be addressed with a crypto-
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graphic solution, but need a monitoring and accusation system. The framework provides
a solid bedrock for this system, but itself does not implement the functionality.
Identity-based cryptography itself is under continuing study and development. On
the one hand, algorithms and implementations of higher efficiency and security level are
being developed; while on the other hand, security flaws are being discovered—some
of them are fixed and some others remain open. The selection of curves on which IBC
is implemented is very subtle and critical to efficiency and security. There are some
controversial discussions on the security of this cryptography, and it is not yet widely
accepted. We need to keep track of the latest developments in IBC.
We intend to consider these topics as future work in our research.
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